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1 Introduction
For decades provision of electricity was organized based on vertically integrated geo-
graphic monopolies, which operated the entire supply chain from generation, trans-
mission and distribution to retailing of electrical energy. These monopolies were
either held by state-owned or regulated private companies. Starting in the 1980s
this traditional model of the electricity sector has been liberalized and restructured
in many countries.1 The main goal of these restructuring efforts is to create an in-
stitutional framework which enables the efficient allocation of resources based on
market mechanisms. To achieve this, the vertically integrated monopolies have been
split up and competitively organized markets for generation, wholesale and retail of
electricity have been created.2 The grid infrastructure on the other hand remains a
natural monopoly, which is regulated in order to avoid exploitation of market power
and to create incentives which align the goals of the regulated monopolists with
overall societal preferences and objectives.
In addition to the described reorganization of the electricity sector a second re-
cent fundamental change has been the increased importance of electricity generation
based on variable renewable energy sources. Traditionally electricity was mainly
generated in large-scale thermal and hydro power plants. However, the potential for
hydroelectricity is geographically limited and thermal power plants are largely based
on combustion of fossil fuels, which causes negative environmental externalities for
example due to carbon emissions. Consequently, as a result of increased global ef-
forts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and fight anthropogenic climate change,
the share of non-hydro renewable electricity generation based on wind and solar
energy in global electricity production has increased rapidly over the last years.3 In
light of the recent Paris Agreement to limit the global temperature increase to well
below 2 ◦C this trend is expected to persist.
The integration of large shares of variable renewable electricity generation into lib-
eralized electricity markets creates additional economic and regulatory challenges.
1See International Energy Agency (2016b) for an overview of the global status of liberalization.
2Note that the question whether the retail sector should be organized competitively is still subject to
debate. See Batlle (2013) for a discussion.
3Non-hydro renewable energy accounted for 7.5% of total global power production in 2016. In 2000
the share was roughly 1.5%. See BP (2017).
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These arise from the specific properties of variable renewable generation technolo-
gies, especially wind and solar energy, which differ from conventional thermal power
plants. One key difference is that electricity generation based on wind and solar
energy is weather dependent and fluctuates over time. As a result, the electricity
generation is not perfectly predictable and depends on the specific weather condi-
tions at a given location. The spatial heterogeneity of wind and solar resources also
demands for a more decentralized structure of electricity systems, in which individ-
ual generation capacities are smaller in scale and more distributed in comparison to
centralized structures based on large-scale thermal power plants.
Against the described backdrop, the regulatory challenge is to design a framework,
which enables the efficient integration of renewable electricity generation into the
competitively organized parts of the electricity sector. Because of the strong impli-
cations of high shares of renewable electricity generation on the electricity grid, it
is equally important that the regulatory framework incentivizes an efficient and re-
liable integration of renewable generation capacities into the grid infrastructure. As
these challenges have proven to be non-trivial in practice, a vivid debate has been
sparked around the efficient integration of renewable energy into liberalized elec-
tricity markets in science as well as in the political sphere. The aim of this disserta-
tion is to add new insights to this debate by analyzing different specific issues which
arise due to the availability of renewable electricity generation along the unbundled
supply chain of the power sector. Building on that, possible improvements of the
market design and regulation with respect to the integration of weather-dependent
renewable energy are identified. The thesis consists of three main chapters, each
based on a single paper:
• Chapter 2: Grid Investment and Support Schemes for Renewable Electricity
Generation (based on Wagner (2016), forthcoming in The Energy Journal)
• Chapter 3: Distributed Generation in Unbundled Electricity Markets (based
on Wagner (2018))
• Chapter 4: Optimal Allocation of Variable Renewable Energy Considering Con-
tributions to Security of Supply (based on Peter and Wagner (2018), both au-
thors contributed equally)
The remainder of the introduction is structured as follows: Section 1.1 gives an
overview of the contents and the focus of each chapter. Building on that, Section
1.2 discusses and compares the different applied methodological approaches and
identifies directions for future research.
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1.1 Outline
1.1 Outline
Chapter 2 analyzes coordination problems between investment into grid infrastruc-
ture and investment into electricity generation based on weather-dependent renew-
able energy. These problems emerge because in unbundled electricity systems sep-
arate entities such as private generation investors and regulated transmission oper-
ators decide on investment into generation and into grid infrastructure. As invest-
ments into renewable generation capacities are largely driven by subsidy mecha-
nisms in practice, the chapter focuses on the influence of different subsidy schemes
on the locational choice of renewable energy investors and the resulting implications
on grid investment. The considered subsidy schemes are feed-in tariffs, feed-in pre-
miums and capacity payments. The analysis is based on a stylized model with two
possible locations for renewable generation investment and lumpy transmission in-
vestment. Electricity generation at the two locations is stochastic with different total
expected generation and imperfectly correlated generation patterns.
Based on the theoretical model it is shown that none of the assessed support mech-
anisms lead to an efficient allocation of generation capacities. Consequently, a reg-
ulatory framework in which grid operators are obliged to connect new generation
capacities and therefore follow generation investment can lead to substantial inef-
ficiencies. Instead, a benevolent grid operator can implement the efficient system
configuration by anticipatory grid investment, which means that decisions on grid
investment precede generation investment. However, imperfect regulation can lead
to disincentives if transmission operators are able to invest proactively and maximize
profits within the regulatory constraints. Finally it is shown that network charges
for renewable power producers which internalize the grid integration costs into in-
vestment decisions are also suited to implement the first best solution.
Chapter 3 shifts the focus to the retail part of the supply chain of liberalized elec-
tricity systems. More specifically it is analyzed how the availability of distributed
generation technologies such as rooftop photovoltaic systems or small-scale wind
power plants impacts imperfect retail markets for electricity. As distributed genera-
tion is used by end consumers to directly produce electricity it substitutes grid-based
electricity purchased via retailers. Consequently, interactions between distributed
generation and retailing emerge. To analyze these interactions, a theoretical model
based on a spatial competition framework, in which consumers have heterogeneous
preferences towards retailers and can choose distributed generation as an alterna-
tive to grid-based electricity, is developed. In the model, only a limited share of
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electricity consumption can be substituted with distributed generation in order to
reflect the fact that on the one hand not all consumers are able to use distributed
generation, for example because of spatial constraints or financing restrictions, and
on the other hand even consumers who use distributed generation typically keep
a grid connection as full autarky is very costly with current technologies. Within
this model framework, the impact of distributed generation on retailers as well as
implications on optimal subsidization of distributed generation are assessed.
The analysis shows, that distributed generation puts competitive pressure on re-
tailers and induces reduced mark-ups. Regulators can exploit this effect by using
subsidies to position distributed generation as a competitor to grid-based electricity
and shift welfare from producers to consumers. However, if the subsidized cost of
distributed generation is sufficiently low there is a point at which retailers discard
the substitutable share of electricity demand in order to realize higher margins by
supplying only the non-substitutable share of demand. As a result of this effect,
increased subsidies for distributed generation can harm consumers and decrease
consumer surplus if the increase in subsidization induces retailers to discard the
substitutable share of demand. Additionally it is shown that retailers are more re-
luctant to discard the substitutable share of demand as the substitutable share in
electricity consumption increases.
In practice, distributed generation is subsidized indirectly by exempting it from
grid fee payments in many jurisdictions. Because of this common regulatory prac-
tice, the basic model is extended to analyze interactions of grid fee structures and
distributed generation within the presented framework. I find that the optimal reg-
ulatory strategy can also be implemented with grid fee exemptions. However, this
can only be realized based on a two-part tariff structure in which distributed gener-
ation is exempted from variable grid fee payments while a fixed grid fee component
ensures recovery of fixed costs for the grid operator. Solely volumetric grid fees
are not suited to implement optimal subsidization and lead to inefficient levels of
distributed generation.
Chapter 4 focuses on generation investment and the question how electricity gen-
eration based on weather-dependent renewable energy sources can contribute to
reliability in power systems. The presented analysis contributes to this question by
developing a new methodology to endogenously determine the capacity value of
generation capacities based on variable renewable energy in large-scale optimiza-
tion models for electricity markets. After the methodology is introduced, it is ap-
plied to simulate an optimal pathway to a decarbonized European electricity system
4
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in 2050, which explicitly accounts for the location-dependent contribution of wind
power to reliability. The results show that wind power can substantially contribute
to reliability despite the weather-induced stochasticity.
Building on this outcome we identify three fundamental drivers for the develop-
ment of the capacity value of wind power over time. First, the capacity value exhibits
decreasing returns to scale which means that the average contribution to reliability
decreases as total installed wind power capacity increases. Second, technological
innovation increases the capacity value of wind power as current wind power plants
are gradually substituted by state of the art wind turbines with higher hub heights
and larger rated capacity over time. These plants allow for a more stable electricity
production. Third, increasing European market integration due to extended inter-
connection capacities between countries increases the capacity value of wind power
because volatile generation can be backed up by electricity imports instead of addi-
tional conventional generation capacities.
We conclude that existing modeling approaches for long-term scenarios in the
electricity sector lead to inefficient levels of dispatchable back-up capacities and in-
efficient spatial distributions of renewable power capacities because the contribution
to reliability is not or only crudely accounted for. From a regulatory perspective the
results suggest that adequacy studies and capacity mechanisms should consider the
contribution of variable renewable energy sources to reliability, for example by al-
lowing renewable generation capacities to participate in capacity markets.
1.2 Methodological approaches and future research
The three chapters address different research questions and therefore apply different
methodological approaches. Chapter 2 and 3 use stylized theoretical model frame-
works which allow for an analytical solution. Chapter 4 on the other hand applies
a numerical solution approach via optimization. Each of the chapters relies on spe-
cific assumptions, which on the one hand allow to focus on the respective research
question without losing tractability but on the other hand imply a loss in generality.
Consequently, understanding the implications of these assumptions is crucial when
interpreting the presented results. Relaxing critical assumptions on the other hand
opens promising directions for future research. These aspects are discussed in this
section.
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The analysis in Chapter 2 builds upon a stylized model of grid investment, gener-
ation investment and stochastic electricity production from weather-dependent re-
newable energy sources. While the model captures the fundamental characteristics
of these properties in order to derive general theoretical results, its practical applica-
bility to derive specific numerical conclusions for real electricity systems is limited.
Consequently, an application of the model to a real-world power system with an ex-
plicit representation of grid infrastructure, the conventional power plant fleet as well
as real-world statistical properties of variable renewable energy would provide inter-
esting additional insights. Because of the complexity of real-world power systems,
this would require numerical methodologies.
More fundamental limitations of the presented model in Chapter 2 are the as-
sumptions of perfect competition, perfect information as well as the lack of endoge-
nous investments into conventional power generation. While perfect competition is
a common assumption in the economic literature, in the present context it neglects
for example the possibility that individual wind power investors control a large port-
folio of assets. In that case there are additional incentives for the locational choice
of investments, which arise from the effect of an additional unit of generation ca-
pacity on the entire generation portfolio of an investor. Also strategic withholding
of capacities could be an issue. Perfect information implies that the regulator is
perfectly informed about the quality of different wind locations and can therefore
make efficient decisions. In practice there could be substantial informational asym-
metries for example because investors have private information on wind conditions
at specific sites. As a result, the question arises how a regulatory framework that
incentivizes the revelation of private information could be designed. Finally, it is
likely that the addition of intermittent wind power capacities induces changes in the
structure of the conventional power plant fleet. Including endogenous investment
into conventional generation would therefore provide interesting insights into the
long term effects of subsidized renewable power production. All these issues could
be addressed by extending the presented theoretical model framework.
The analysis in Chapter 3 is also based on a stylized model, which focuses in
contrast to Chapter 2 on the retail market. The model is based on a spatial compe-
tition framework, which is a widely applied model class in economic literature.4 It
enables the representation of horizontal product differentiation and heterogeneous
consumer preferences towards retailers, which are exploited by retailers to exercise
market power. As electricity is a homogenous good, the assumption of consumer
4See for example Eiselt et al. (2015) for a detailed overview.
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preferences might itself be questionable. However, empirical evidence suggests that
consumer preferences towards electricity retailers indeed exist.5 One of the main
arguments is that preferences are a result of branding activities which imply het-
erogeneity.6 Nevertheless the applied model is only a crude and one-dimensional
representation of consumer preferences. Hence a natural extension of the presented
framework is the integration of more complex models of consumer choice. One
possibility would be the representation of switching costs. Also an extension with
multidimensional preferences would be possible, could however yield very complex
results.
In addition to a more detailed representation of the demand side there are also
potential extensions on the supply side. On the one hand the model assumes fixed
locations of the retailers, which means that the degree of horizontal differentiation
is exogenous. Consequently, a similar application with endogenous differentiation
would be interesting. Also, the model assumes exogenous wholesale prices for elec-
tricity. In practice, distributed generation causes a feedback effect on wholesale
prices because expensive conventional generation is crowded out of the market. As
a result a decreasing effect on wholesale prices emerges. Consequently, the model
could be extended to account for this additional complexity. Finally, the theoretically
derived propositions on the effect of distributed generation on retail prices could be
empirically tested based on econometric methods.
The methodology presented in Chapter 4 builds upon a large-scale investment
and dispatch model for electricity markets. To keep these models computationally
tractable they typically rely on formulations as linear programs, which minimize
total system costs. However, linear cost minimization is only possible under strict
economic assumptions such as perfect competition, perfect foresight and inelastic
demand. Consequently, the large-scale applicability comes at the cost of simplified
market representations. In order to integrate the non-linear contribution of wind
power capacities to security of supply in a linear model framework we rely on an
iterative solution approach. While this approach enables the successive linearization
of the non-linear characteristics of the contribution of weather-dependent renewable
energy to security of supply, the non-linearity of the underlying problem remains.
As a result, we can only numerically check for existence and uniqueness of a global
optimum without formal proof. Hence, further research could focus on formally
analyzing the properties of the presented problem.
5See for example Kalkbrenner et al. (2017) or Tabi et al. (2014).
6Analogous arguments are also made in similar applications for other homogeneous goods such as
telecommunication, see for example Laffont et al. (1998).
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The large-scale application in Chapter 4 builds upon spatially and temporally high-
resoluted data for European wind and solar power production. The data is based on
a meteorological re-analysis model. While this methodology enables the generation
of consistent high-resolution data on weather-dependent renewable electricity pro-
duction over a large time frame, it must be kept in mind that the data is itself a model
result and is therefore not equivalent to measured wind speed and solar irradiation
data. Nevertheless re-analysis data is increasingly used in the scientific literature
because consistent measured long-term historical weather data in high spatial res-
olution for Europe or other relevant regions does not exist. Future research should
therefore focus on further validation and calibration of re-analysis data in the con-
text of electricity market models. This is especially crucial in the context of analyses
of reliability issues.
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2 Grid Investment and Support Schemes for
Renewable Electricity Generation
The unbundling of formerly vertically integrated utilities in liberalized electricity
markets led to a coordination problem between investments in the regulated electric-
ity grid and investments into new power generation. At the same time investments
into generation capacities based on weather-dependent renewable energy sources
such as wind and solar energy are increasingly subsidized with different support
schemes. Against this backdrop this article analyzes the locational choice of private
wind power investors under different support schemes and the implications on grid
investments. I find that investors do not choose system optimal locations in feed-in
tariff schemes, feed-in premium schemes and subsidy systems with direct capacity
payments. Consequently, inefficiencies arise if transmission investment follows wind
power investment. A benevolent transmission operator can implement the first-best
solution by anticipatory investment behavior, which is however only applicable un-
der perfect regulation. Alternatively a location-dependent network charge for wind
power producers can directly influence investment decisions and internalize the grid
integration costs of wind power generation.
2.1 Introduction
A large number of electricity systems, for example in the United States or Europe,
have been liberalized and restructured over the last decades.1 A central part of
these restructuring efforts is unbundling, which describes the vertical separation
of the monopolistic network from the potentially competitive parts of the system,
namely generation, wholesale and retail. In unbundled electricity systems, separate
entities such as private generation investors and regulated transmission operators
make investment decisions based on their individual agenda. Nevertheless, there
exist strong interactions between these decisions because of the physical properties
1See Joskow (1997) for a general discussion of electricity market liberalization for the US power
sector. A similar analysis for European markets can be found in Jamasb and Pollitt (2005). For
a retrospective discussion of lessons learned from market liberalization in various countries see
Joskow (2008).
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of the electricity system, which leads to a coordination problem between generation
investment and grid investment. New power plants can for example increase net-
work congestion and therefore force extensions which could be avoided by choosing
a different location for the investment.2
To address the outlined coordination problem, a proactive approach to transmis-
sion planning is increasingly proposed, in which the transmission operator attempts
to optimize the aggregated electricity system by taking into account consumer wel-
fare, generation costs and transmission costs. Consequently, the transmission plan-
ner explicitly considers the effect of grid extensions on the decision problem of gen-
eration investors in order to implement an overall welfare optimal system configu-
ration. Anticipatory planning processes therefore extend the traditional approaches
to transmission investment, which focus primarily on reliability issues and technical
feasibility instead of an economically optimal total system configuration.
The need for cost effective transmission planning is intensified by the increas-
ing importance of electricity generation from intermittent renewable energy sources
such as wind and solar. Because of the weather dependency of these energy sources,
the best locations for wind and solar power plants are typically distributed and lo-
cated away from load centers. As a result, the integration of large amounts of genera-
tion capacity based on wind and solar energy into the electricity system requires sub-
stantial investments into the electricity grid.3 Despite these integration challenges,
renewable energy investors face favorable regulations regarding grid connection in
many countries, which often oblige the grid operator to connect new generation ca-
pacities based on renewable energy sources.4 Consequently, the regulatory frame-
work frequently promotes reactive approaches to transmission planning.
Investment into electricity generation from renewable energy sources is largely
driven by support mechanisms such as feed-in tariff systems, feed-in premium sys-
2Kunz (2013) finds that investment into coal fired power generation in northern Germany signifi-
cantly increases congestion costs. Due to lower inland transportation costs for coal, locations at
the North Sea coast in northern Germany are more attractive for private generation investors com-
pared to locations in southern Germany if congestion costs are not internalized.
3The required grid investments in the European electricity system to reach the European
CO2 reduction and renewable energy targets are analyzed in Fürsch et al. (2013). The results
indicate that optimal network extension requires transmission investments of more than 200 bil-
lion EUR until 2050. A similar analysis for the United States can be found in National Renewable
Energy Laboratory (2012). The required average yearly transmission investment to reach a share
of renewable electricity generation of 80% by 2050 is estimated in a range between 6.4 and 8.4
billion USD.
4See Swider et al. (2008) for a discussion of the conditions for grid connection of renewable electricity
generation in Europe.
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tems or capacity subsidies.5 A crucial difference between these subsidy systems is
how producers of renewable electricity are exposed to market signals. Under feed-
in tariffs renewable generators receive a fixed payment for every produced kilowatt
hour of electrical energy. Consequently, generators are entirely isolated from mar-
ket signals. With capacity subsidies on the other hand, producers of renewable en-
ergy are fully exposed to market signals because they generate revenue only due to
electricity sales in the wholesale market. Feed-in premiums combine the described
approaches by paying a fixed premium on top of the wholesale electricity price to
renewable energy producers.
Against the described backdrop, this paper analyzes the influence of the subsidy
scheme for renewable electricity generation on the locational choice of renewable
energy investors and the subsequent implications for grid investments. Of particu-
lar interest are inefficiencies which arise due to deviations from the socially optimal
allocation of renewable generation capacities when transmission investment follows
renewable energy investment. Building on that, anticipatory behavior of the trans-
mission operator is assessed as a potential remedy to avoid inefficient system con-
figurations. To analyze these issues a highly stylized model with one demand node,
two possible locations for renewable generation investment and lumpy transmission
investment is developed. Electricity generation at the two locations is stochastic with
different total expected generation and imperfectly correlated generation patterns.
Renewable energy investments are subsidized by a feed-in tariff scheme, a feed-in
premium system or direct capacity payments in order to reach an exogenous renew-
able target.6 The analysis is conducted for wind power, however the results apply
for all intermittent and location-dependent renewable energy sources such as solar
or marine energy.
The analysis shows, that none of the assessed support mechanisms guarantees an
efficient allocation of generation capacities. In a feed-in tariff system, investors de-
velop only the wind location with the highest expected generation because they are
isolated from market signals. Consequently, social benefits from developing both lo-
cations, which arise because of the imperfect correlation between wind generation at
5An overview of support policies for renewable electricity generation in OECD and non-OECD coun-
tries is provided in International Energy Agency (2015). The general question of the economic
justification of renewable energy support instead of direct CO2 pricing is not part this paper. The
most common argument for renewable energy support policies are market failures due to learning
spillovers. See for example Fischer and Newell (2008) or Gerlagh et al. (2009) for an analysis. An
extensive review of literature on the rationale of support policies for renewable energies can be
found in Fischer (2010).
6Note that investment based tax credits or low interest loans are equivalent to direct capacity pay-
ments as they reduce the net present value of investment costs.
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both sites, are not realized. With capacity payments on the other hand, investors do
receive market signals but grid investment costs are external. As a result, investors
diversify locations even if the social benefit does not justify the additional grid in-
vestment costs, which are necessary to integrate the second wind location into the
system. In a feed-in premium system, investors generate revenue from fixed pre-
mium payments and from market participation. Hence, investors act either as in a
feed-in tariff system or as in a system with capacity payments, depending on which
of the two revenue streams dominates. Building on these results I find, that the
efficient system configuration can be implemented by anticipatory transmission in-
vestment. The results imply, that the locational choice of investors depends on the
choice of the subsidy mechanism and that a more active role of the grid operator
can help to efficiently integrate renewable energy sources into electricity systems.
The described results are derived in a stylized model framework. Nevertheless,
the implications are of high policy relevance. The coordination between investment
into generation capacities based on renewable energy sources and investment into
transmission lines is a practical issue in a large variety of countries which plan to
increase the share of renewable energy in electricity generation. Practical exam-
ples for the United States, the European Union, Mexico, Panama, Egypt, Brazil and
the Philippines are provided in Madrigal and Stoft (2012). Additionally, numerical
studies show that the analyzed inefficiencies are already of relevance in practice.
Obermüller (2017) shows that the current regulatory framework in Germany over-
incentivizes investment in Northern Germany because transmission bottlenecks are
not accounted for. Similarly, Bjørnebye et al. (2018) show for Norway that wind
power investment at inefficient locations, which is encouraged by the current regu-
lation, could increase the required grid expansion by 55%. Building on these prac-
tical examples, the present paper derives some general conclusions and intends to
derive practical implications for policy makers based on theoretical economics.
The paper is mainly related to two literature streams. The first relevant literature
stream examines the efficiency of different subsidy schemes for electricity generation
from renewable energy sources. Hiroux and Saguan (2010) give an overview of the
advantages and disadvantages of different support schemes with respect to the inte-
gration of large amounts of wind power into the European electricity system. They
argue that support schemes should expose wind power producers to market signals
in order to incentivize system optimal choices of wind sites and maintenance plan-
ning or to incorporate portfolio effects. Klessmann et al. (2008) on the other hand
point out that market exposure increases risk for investors, which leads to a higher
12
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required level of financial support in order to stimulate investments. The impact of
renewable energy subsidies on the spatial allocation of wind power investments is
explicitly studied in Schmidt et al. (2013) and Pechan (2017). Schmidt et al. (2013)
analyze the spatial distribution of wind turbines under a feed-in premium and a feed-
in tariff scheme based on an empirical model for Austria. They find that the feed-in
premium system leads to substantially higher diversification of locations for wind
power generation. Pechan (2017) shows in a numerical model, that a feed-in pre-
mium system combined with nodal pricing leads to a system friendly allocation of
wind power if existing transmission lines are congested. All mentioned papers do
not consider capacity payments or the required grid extensions to integrate the wind
power capacity into the electricity system.
The second relevant literature stream is focused on the coordination problem be-
tween transmission and generation investment in liberalized power markets and the
effects of anticipatory transmission investment. Sauma and Oren (2006) and Pozo
et al. (2013) show that a proactive transmission planner can induce generation com-
panies to invest in a more socially efficient manner by anticipating investments in
generation capacity. Höffler and Wambach (2013) show that generation investment
can lead to overinvestment or underinvestment in the electricity grid when private
investors do not take the costs and benefits of network extensions into account. They
also show that a capacity market can incentivize private investors to make socially
efficient locational choices. The implications of renewable subsidies on the coordi-
nation problem are not part of the mentioned studies. The interactions of renewable
portfolio standards and transmission planning are examined in Munoz et al. (2013).
They show that ignoring the lumpy nature of transmission investment when plan-
ning the necessary grid extension for the integration of renewable energies can lead
to significant inefficiencies in network investments. The effect of different support
schemes is not part of the analysis.
In summary the contribution of the paper is threefold. First, the locational choice
of renewable energy investors under different support schemes is analyzed in a the-
oretical framework. Second, interactions between the renewable support scheme
and grid investments are analyzed. Third, anticipatory transmission investment is
analyzed focusing explicitly on the coordination of subsidized renewable investment
and grid investment. Therefore the paper intends to close the gap between the lit-
erature streams on support schemes for renewable energy and on the coordination
problem between generation investment and grid investment in unbundled electric-
ity systems.
13
2 Grid Investment and Support Schemes for Renewable Electricity Generation
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the
model and analyzes the efficient allocation of renewable generation capacities as
well as the investment problems for renewable energy investors and grid invest-
ments. Building on that, welfare effects are analyzed and a simple numerical exam-
ple is presented. Section 2.3 introduces asymmetric grid investment costs, imperfect
regulation of the transmission operator and network charges for renewable produc-
ers as model extensions. Section 2.4 concludes.
2.2 The model
We consider a model with three nodes D, H and L, which are not connected initially.
At node D electricity consumption is located with an inelastic demand of quantity
d. Additionally, two conventional generation technologies are located at node D. A
cheap base-load technology with marginal generation costs c1 and limited genera-
tion capacity q¯ as well as a peak-load technology with unlimited generation capacity
but higher marginal generation costs c2 > c1. It is assumed that a political target to
reach a generation capacity KT < d based on renewable energy sources is in place.
7
Additionally it is assumed that q¯ ≥ d2 .8 The renewable target can be reached by in-
vestment into wind generation capacity at nodes H and L. Investment costs for one
unit of capacity are IW .9 Marginal costs of wind power production are assumed to be
zero. Investments are subsidized either by a feed-in tariff system, feed-in premium
system or direct capacity payments. To connect the wind power plants at nodes
H and L to the demand node D, transmission lines have to be built. Investment
into transmission requires investment costs IG and is modeled as a binary decision.
Hence, once an investment is made, the transmission capacity is unlimited, which
represents the lumpy character of transmission investments.10
The model configuration is depicted in Figure 2.1. Figure 2.1(a) shows the nodes
7In practice political renewable targets are defined in terms of capacity or electricity generation.
However, even in countries with generation targets, for example Germany, the monitoring of target
achievement is often undertaken based on installed capacity. See International Renewable Energy
Agency (2015) for a discussion.
8This assumption is made in order to focus the analysis on the question if and under which conditions
the wind locations H and L are developed. Extending the analysis for q¯ < d2 is straight forward
but requires additional case distinctions which do not provide substantial insights regarding the
central questions of the study.
9The capacity factor is assumed to be one, which means that the full installed capacity is available
for production if wind is present. In reality this factor is smaller than one and depends on the wind
speed as well as the technical properties of the wind power plant.
10Lumpiness describes the fact that transmission capacity is increased in discrete steps as a result of
strong economies of scale, see for example Joskow and Tirole (2005).
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of the model as well as the potential network connections represented by dashed
lines. Figure 2.1(b) shows the supply curve of conventional generation with different
marginal generation costs for the base-load and peak-load technology. The depicted
quantity (d − q¯) represents the amount of electricity that has to be generated with
the costly peak-load technology if no wind power generation is present.
H L
D
(a) Network configuration
𝒒ഥ
c2
𝒅 𝒒
𝑪′ 𝒅 − 𝒒ഥ
c1
(b) Supply curve of conventional generation
Figure 2.1: Basic model setup
Wind generation at nodes H and L is stochastic with three possible states h, l and
hl, which occur with probabilities ρh, ρl and ρhl (ρh + ρl + ρhl = 1). In states h
and l only wind power plants at node H or L produce electricity whereas in state
hl wind power is produced at both nodes.11 Additionally it is assumed that ρh > ρl
which means that the expected wind output is higher at node H.
The described configuration accounts for two important properties of wind power
generation. The first property is a substantial variation of expected electricity gen-
eration between different wind locations. The second property is that wind power
generation is imperfectly correlated between different locations as a result of the
spatial variation in weather conditions. In the model the correlation between the lo-
cations H and L can be modified by the value of ρhl . If ρhl equals zero wind output
is perfectly negative correlated between the two nodes. The higher ρhl the higher
is the correlation between nodes and the lower is the probability that only one of
11A fourth state in which none of the locations produce wind power is not included for reasons of
simplification. Such a state could however be included without changing the results of the analysis.
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the locations produces wind power.12 Only two wind locations are chosen for the
analysis in order to simplify the model. However, adding additional locations would
not change the implications of the paper. Also, in practice there are typically only a
limited number of suited geographical areas which have substantially differing wind
properties within a country.13
The dynamic setting of the model consists of three stages: Transmission invest-
ment, wind power investment and cost minimal dispatch. The dispatch takes place
in the last stage of the model after the stochastic wind generation is realized. In-
vestment decisions on the other hand are based on the expected wind output. To
assess the effects of uncoordinated generation and grid investments as well as an-
ticipatory and reactive behavior of the transmission operator (TSO), three different
model configurations are considered:
(i) Central planner: The central planner jointly invests into grid and wind power
capacities in order to minimize total expected system costs. This model setting
represents a vertically integrated electricity system and is considered as a first-
best benchmark.
(ii) Reactive TSO: Under reactive transmission investment, revenue maximizing
investment into wind power with feed-in tariff (FIT), feed-in premium (FIP) or
capacity payments (CAP) happens in the first stage followed by transmission
investment in the second stage. It is assumed that the TSO has to comply
with the renewable target and is therefore obliged to connect all wind power
investments from the first stage. Consequently, the TSO solely reacts to wind
power investments from the first stage.
(iii) Anticipatory TSO: Under anticipatory transmission investment the transmis-
sion operator acts first and builds transmission lines to integrate wind power
capacities according to the capacity target KT . In the second stage, wind power
investors build generation capacities given the network infrastructure from the
first stage. As an additional steering instrument the TSO is able to limit trans-
fer capacities of transmission lines. Hence, the TSO can actively influence
wind power investments.
12The described representation of stochastic wind power generation is similar to Ambec and Crampes
(2012) and Milstein and Tishler (2015). Both papers analyze interactions between investments
into dispatchable and intermittent sources of electricity generation. A disadvantage of this simple
model of stochasticity is that the variance of wind generation can not be changed independently
of the expected wind generation. Note that the model considers only one period of wind genera-
tion. However an extension with multiple periods, e.g. for every day in a year, can be realized by
repetition, as done for example in Milstein and Tishler (2015).
13See Madrigal and Stoft (2012) for a geographical depiction of wind regions in several countries.
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In all settings perfect information and risk neutral behavior of investors is as-
sumed. Free market entry is assumed for renewable investors, which means that no
market power can be exercised. In the basic model, the TSO is assumed to behave
benevolently as a result of perfect regulation. Imperfect regulation is discussed as a
model extension in Section 2.3. Figure 2.2 illustrates the dynamics of the model for
all considered cases graphically.
Realization of
wind generation
Cost minimal 
dispatch
Realization of
wind generation
Reactive TSO
Anticipatory TSO
Wind investment FIT/FIP/CAP, 
revenue maximizing
t=1 t=2 t=3
Grid investment, 
benevolent TSO
Cost minimal 
dispatch
Grid investment, 
benevolent TSO
Wind investment FIT/FIP/CAP, 
revenue maximizing
Realization of
wind generation
Cost minimal 
dispatch
Central Planner
Joint wind and grid
investment, 
cost minimizing
Figure 2.2: Dynamic model settings
The model is solved by backward induction. Therefore the dispatch problem,
which is common for all described model settings, is solved first, followed by the
renewable and transmission investment problems.
2.2.1 The dispatch problem
In the third stage of the model, the dispatch costs CD are minimized based on in-
vestments in the prior stages and the realization of wind power generation. Con-
sequently, conventional generation capacities at node D are utilized to meet the
electricity demand that can not be covered by wind power generation delivered to
node D given the grid and wind power investments from the first and second stage.
As a result, renewable generation R is exogenous in the third stage and conventional
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generation q is dispatched according to the problem formulated in Equations (2.1a)
and (2.1b).14
min
q
CD =
qc1 if q < q¯q¯c1 + (q− q¯) c2 if q ≥ q¯ (2.1a)
s.t. d = q + R (2.1b)
The cost function (2.1a) represents the two available conventional generation tech-
nologies with marginal generation cost equal to c1 as long as the conventional gen-
eration q is smaller than the maximum capacity q¯ of the base-load technology. If
conventional generation exceeds q¯ the marginal generation costs c2 of the peak-load
technology incur. Equation (2.1b) is the balance constraint which ensures that elec-
tricity demand d is met. Setting the partial derivatives ∂L∂ q and ∂L∂ λ of the lagrangian
L = CD +λ (d − q− R) equal to zero yields the following expressions:
λ=
c1 if q < q¯c2 if q ≥ q¯ (2.2a)
q = d − R (2.2b)
Equation (2.2a) expresses that the market price equals marginal generation costs.
Equation (2.2b) states that conventional generation equals residual demand. These
expressions are a stylized representation of the merit order effect as the market price
for electricity drops from c2 to c1 if the wind generation delivered to demand node
D is higher than (d − q¯).15
Because of the stochastic nature of wind generation, the investment problems are
based on the expected dispatch outcome which depends on the expected value of
wind power generation E (R) delivered to node D:
E (R) = ρhKH +ρl KL +ρhl (KH + KL) (2.3a)
KH = CapH LH (2.3b)
KL = CapL LL (2.3c)
LL , LH ∈ {1,0} (2.3d)
14Curtailment of wind power generation is not considered.
15The merit order effect describes the price depressing impact of renewable electricity generation
with marginal generation costs close to zero on wholesale prices. See Würzburg et al. (2013) for a
review of empirical studies which analyze this effect for different European markets.
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E (R) is a function of the installed wind power capacity at nodes H and L and the
probability that these capacities will produce electricity. Additionally, a transmission
line between the demand node and the wind site has to be in place in order to use the
wind power production to meet electricity demand. This is expressed in Equations
(2.3b) and (2.3c) by the product of installed capacities CapH , CapL and the binary
variables LH , LL which indicate if a connection between the wind locations and the
demand node is in place.
Because of the piecewise linear form of the cost function of conventional power
generation, several cases of connected wind power capacity have to be distinguished
in order to determine the expected dispatch outcome. Decisive for the case distinc-
tion is if the conventional peak load technology is crowded out of the market as result
of the realized wind generation in each possible state. Based on this logic, five cases
can be distinguished as indicated in Equation (2.4). In the first case the peak load
technology is displaced in every possible outcome. In the second and third case the
peak load technology is not displaced if states l or h respectively are realized. In
the fourth case the peak load technology is only displaced if state hl is realized and
in the fifth case the peak load technology is not displaced in all outcomes. The ag-
gregated connected wind power capacity at both wind locations is represented by
KA = KH + KL .
E (CD) =

c1 (d −ρl KL −ρhKH −ρhl KA)
if KH , KL > d − q¯
c1
 
ρl q¯ +ρh (d − KH) +ρhl (d − KA)

+ c2ρl (d − q¯− KL)
if KH > d − q¯, KL ≤ d − q¯
c1
 
ρhq¯ +ρl (d − KL) +ρhl (d − KA)

+ c2ρh (d − q¯− KH)
if KH ≤ d − q¯, KL > d − q¯
c1
 
(ρh +ρl) q¯ +ρhl (d − KA)

+ c2
 
(ρh +ρl) (d − q¯)−ρhKH −ρl KL

if KH , KL ≤ d − q¯, KA > d − q¯
c1q¯ + c2 (d − q¯−ρl KL −ρhKH −ρhl KA)
if KH , KL ≤ d − q¯, KA ≤ d − q¯
(2.4)
Analogously the expected market price E (λ) can be expressed by the marginal gen-
eration costs c1 and c2 weighted with the probability that each technology sets the
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market price in the five distinguished cases.
E (λ) =

c1 if KH , KL > d − q¯
c1 (1−ρh) + c2ρh if KH > d − q¯, KL ≤ d − q¯
c1 (1−ρl) + c2ρl if KH ≤ d − q¯, KL > d − q¯
c1ρhl + c2 (1−ρhl) if KH , KL ≤ d − q¯, KA > d − q¯
c2 if KH , KL ≤ d − q¯, KA ≤ d − q¯
(2.5)
Equations (2.4) and (2.5) show that the expected dispatch costs as well as the ex-
pected electricity price decrease with increasing connected wind power capacity as
a result of the merit order effect. Additionally the effect of imperfect correlation of
wind generation between the locations is apparent because the conventional peak
load technology is only displaced completely in all states if the installed wind capac-
ity at both locations exceeds (d − q¯).
2.2.2 The central planner investment problem
The central planner jointly invests into wind power generation capacity and trans-
mission lines in order to meet the wind power capacity target KT . The objective of
the central planner is to minimize total system costs which include expected dispatch
costs and investment costs. With specific investment costs for wind power IW and
grid investment costs IG this translates into the following minimization problem:
min
CapH ,CapL ,LH ,LL
CTotal = E (CD) + I
W (CapH + CapL) + I
G (LH + LL) (2.6a)
s.t. KT = CapH LH + CapL LL (2.6b)
LL , LH ∈ {1, 0} (2.6c)
Because of the binary character of grid investments, problem (2.6) can be solved by
analyzing optimal wind power investment and the corresponding system costs for
all possible network configurations. Consequently, total investment costs with one
wind location and both wind locations connected to the demand node D have to be
compared. Based on this comparison the following proposition can be derived:
Proposition 2.1. The central planner diversifies wind locations if the reduction of
expected dispatch costs outweighs the required additional grid investment costs. De-
pending on the target for wind power capacity, two cases can be distinguished:
(i) For KT ≤ d − q¯ diversification is never optimal
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(ii) For KT > d − q¯ diversification is optimal if and only if:
(c2ρl − c1ρh)
 
KT − (d − q¯)

> IG
Proof. See Appendix 2.5.1.
Proposition 2.1 points out that the central planner faces a trade off between reduc-
ing expected dispatch cost due to diversification of wind sites and the grid investment
costs, which are required to connect the additional location. For renewable targets
below (d − q¯) it is never optimal to develop both locations because there is no benefit
of diversification as long as all the produced wind power at the better wind location
H replaces costly conventional peak-load generation.
For renewable targets above (d − q¯) the central planner always builds wind power
capacity of (d − q¯) at node H. The remaining quantity KT − (d − q¯) can either be
also built at node H to replace base-load generation with probability ρh + ρhl or
alternatively at node L to replace peak-load generation with probability ρl and base-
load generation with probability ρhl . Consequently, a prerequisite for developing
the low wind location L is that the cost difference between peak-load and base-
load generation outweighs the difference in expected wind output between nodes
H and L. Formally this means that c2ρl > c1ρh must hold. If this condition is
true, the central planner chooses to build a capacity of (d − q¯) at the better wind
location H and the remaining KT−(d − q¯) at the low wind location L if the achievable
reduction in expected dispatch costs outweighs the required investment costs for
the additional transmission line to node L. For KT > d − q¯ the potential benefits
of developing the second wind location increase with the renewable target. For
KT = 2 (d − q¯) the maximum potential benefit of diversification is reached, which
means that the central planner never chooses to develop both wind locations if the
condition (c2ρl − c1ρh) (d − q¯)> IG is not satisfied.
The described result of Proposition 2.1 is shown graphically in Figure 2.3.16 Ex-
pected dispatch costs when only node H is connected are depicted by the solid line.
The reduction of expected dispatch cost for one additional unit of wind power ca-
pacity is c2 (ρh +ρhl) for KT ≤ (d − q¯) and c1 (ρh +ρhl) for KT > (d − q¯). Expected
dispatch costs with nodes H and L connected are depicted by the dashed line. For
KT > (d − q¯) the reduction of expected dispatch costs is c2ρl + c1ρhl for every addi-
tional unit of wind power generation. The difference between the solid and dashed
lines corresponds to the reduction in dispatch costs due to diversification of wind
16The depiction in Figure 2.3 assumes that c2ρl > c1ρh is true.
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locations. Developing the low wind location L is socially beneficial if this cost re-
duction exceeds the additional grid investment costs IG . As indicated in Figure 2.3
this is true for capacity targets for renewable energy above a critical level K∗T .17
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Figure 2.3: Expected dispatch costs in the central planner problem
As a result three areas can be distinguished in Figure 2.3. In area I , investment
only at the high wind location is always preferable. In area I I , developing the low
wind location L is not socially beneficial because the achievable reduction in ex-
pected dispatch costs does not outweigh grid investment costs. In area I I I , devel-
oping the low wind location is efficient. The relative size of area I I increases with
IG and decreases with (c2ρl − c1ρh). If (c2ρl − c1ρh) (d − q¯)≤ IG area I I I does not
exist and it is never optimal to develop both locations.
An important result of Proposition 2.1 is that the benefit of wind location diversi-
fication increases with ρl , c2 and q¯, while it decreases with ρh and c1. Consequently,
a lower quality difference between the high wind location H and the low wind loca-
tion L as well as a steeper merit order of the conventional power plant fleet increases
the benefit of developing both wind locations. Additionally, a higher availability of
cheap base load technology increases the achievable reduction in expected dispatch
costs because less peak load generation can be displaced by wind investments at the
better wind location. A higher correlation between wind generation at both wind
locations on the other hand decreases the benefit of diversifying wind locations for
a given probability ρh. The described impact of the correlation between wind gen-
eration at nodes H and L shows that not only the total wind generation but also
17K∗T can be directly derived by solving the second part of Proposition 2.1 for KT .
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the difference in generation patterns over time is decisive for optimal wind power
investment. It can be socially efficient to develop the location with lower total wind
generation because there are situations where the better wind location does not
produce electricity while the low wind location does. This is precisely the potential
benefit of diversification described in Proposition 2.1.
2.2.3 The renewable energy investment problem
In this section the investment problem for wind power producers in an unbundled
electricity system is solved for a feed-in tariff scheme, a feed-in premium system and
direct capacity payments. Based on these results the effects of reactive behavior of
the transmission operator can be assessed. The central planner problem from the
previous section serves as a first-best benchmark to identify inefficiencies.
Feed-in tariff
Under a feed-in tariff scheme, wind power investors receive a fixed payment for every
produced kilowatt hour of electrical energy. Consequently, each revenue maximizing
investor i faces the optimization problem expressed in Equations (2.7a) and (2.7b).
E (pii) represents the expected revenue and F I T the fixed feed-in tariff.
max
CapL,i ,CapH,i
E (pii) = F I T ∗ E (Ri)− IW
 
CapL,i + CapH,i

(2.7a)
s.t. KT =
∑
i
CapH,i LH +
∑
i
CapL,i LL (2.7b)
F I T is assumed to be set by the regulator to a level which guarantees non-negative
expected profits for all required investments to meet the capacity target KT . Wind
power investors maximize the expected revenue by choosing wind capacities with
the highest expected wind generation E (Ri) for a given F I T . Hence, investors never
choose to build capacity at the low wind location L under a feed-in tariff scheme be-
cause the market value of the produced electricity is not internalized and ρh > ρl .
As a result there is underdiversification of wind locations compared to the first-best
solution of the central planner because even if developing both locations is socially
beneficial investors do not invest at node L. Consequently, inefficiencies can arise
in an unbundled system with a feed-in tariff system if the transmission operator
behaves reactively and builds the grid according to the decisions of renewable in-
vestors. The results are summarized in the following proposition:
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Proposition 2.2a. In a feed-in tariff system investors always prefer the location with
the highest expected wind generation because the market value of electricity is not in-
ternalized. As a result, there is underdiversification of wind locations compared to the
first-best solution. Overdiversification of wind locations is not possible.
Proof. See Appendix 2.5.1.
Feed-in premium
In a feed-in premium system, renewable investors sell the produced electrical en-
ergy in the spot market and receive an additional fixed premium payment. Hence,
investors have to take into account not only the expected wind generation but also
the expected market price as well as the correlation between market price and wind
generation. Equations (2.8a) and (2.8b) show the resulting maximization problem
for each renewable investor i. The covariance term enters in Equation (2.8a) because
of the expected market revenue E (λ ∗ Ri) = E (λ) ∗ E (Ri) + Cov (λ, Ri). F I P repre-
sents the fixed premium payment. Again it is assumed, that F I P is set to a level that
ensures the realization of the capacity target KT with non-negative expected profits.
max
CapL,i ,CapH,i
E (pii) = E (λ) ∗ E (Ri) +Cov (λ, Ri) + F I P ∗ E (Ri)− IW
 
CapL,i + CapH,i

(2.8a)
s.t. KT =
∑
i
CapH,i LH +
∑
i
CapL,i LL (2.8b)
As indicated by Equation (2.8a), investors receive two different revenue streams in a
feed-in premium system. The revenue stream from fixed premium payments is only
determined by the expected wind power generation at a given location. The revenue
stream from spot market sales however, additionally depends on the realized market
price. For low renewable targets KT ≤ d−q¯, the market price equals c2 for all possible
states h, l and hl. Consequently, investment is always more profitable at the location
with the highest expected wind generation as both revenue streams are higher for
investments at node H. For investment levels above (d − q¯) it is always preferable to
install a capacity of at least (d − q¯) at node H because of the higher expected wind
output. Above that level an additional unit of wind power capacity at node H earns
less revenue in the spot market because prices are depressed to c1 if states h or hl
are realized. However, investors can instead choose to invest at the second wind
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location, where they still earn the higher market price c2 when state l is realized
and c1 in state hl. As a result, the expected revenue from spot market sales is higher
at node L if c2ρl > c1ρh. The premium payment on the other hand depends only on
the expected wind power generation and is always higher at node H. Consequently,
investors choose to develop the low wind location if the expected additional spot
market revenue at node L outweighs the lower expected premium payments:
c2ρl − c1ρh > (ρh −ρl) F I P (2.9)
Equation (2.9) implies that the profitability of investing at the low wind location
increases with the difference between c2 and c1. Hence, comparable to the central
planner problem the steepness of the merit order of the conventional power plant
fleet is decisive for the profitability of diversifying wind locations. Additionally it can
be seen that a higher feed-in premium decreases the profitability of investing at lo-
cation L, because the share of revenue from the fixed premium payments in relation
to the revenue generated from spot market sales increases. A higher quality of the
low wind location ρl increases the profitability of investments at node L because the
expected spot market revenue at the low wind location increases and the difference
in fixed premium payments compared to the high wind location decreases. Also,
for a given probability ρh, a higher correlation between generation at the two wind
locations decreases the profitability of diversifying wind locations.
The discussed results show that the grid investment costs which are required to
connect the second wind location to node D are external costs for the wind power in-
vestor and are therefore not considered in the decision. Consequently, inefficiencies
arise in a feed-in premium system if transmission investment follows wind power
investors and the optimality conditions in Proposition 2.1 are inconsistent with the
behavior of wind power investors formulated in Equation (2.9). Proposition 2.2b
summarizes the results for wind power investments in a feed-in premium subsidy
scheme.
Proposition 2.2b. In a feed-in premium system investors develop both locations if
the expected additional spot market revenue outweighs the lower premium payments.
Investors underdiversify locations if the revenue stream from premium payments domi-
nates. If the revenue stream from market participation dominates, investors overdiver-
sify locations compared to the first best solution.
Proof. See Appendix 2.5.1.
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To further analyze the implications of Proposition 2.2b it is assumed that the feed-
in premium equals the efficient level, that sets marginal revenue of wind power
investment equal to zero.18 Plugging this value of F I P into Equation (2.9) yields
the following condition for the development of the low wind location L under a
feed-in premium scheme with KT > (d − q¯):
IW <
(c2 − c1)
 
ρl −ρ2l

ρh −ρl (2.10)
As mentioned above the decision on diversification of wind locations in a feed-in
premium scheme depends on the investment costs for wind power plants which
determine the required level of subsidies and subsequently the share of revenue
from fixed premium payments. Consequently, diversifying wind locations becomes
more attractive as the technological maturity of wind power plants increases and
less premium payments are necessary to cover investment costs as indicated by the
left hand side of Equation (2.10). The right hand side is determined by the steepness
of the conventional merit order and the expected wind generation at nodes H and
L. It can be seen that a steeper merit order increases the profitability of investing
at the low wind location. Additionally, an increase in ρl makes investments at node
L more attractive as the right hand side of Equation (2.10) is strictly increasing in
ρl .
19
Capacity payment
In a subsidy system with direct capacity payments, wind power investors generate
revenue only in the spot market. Additionally they receive a fixed subsidy payment
SUB for every unit of capacity they build, which is equivalent to a reduction of the in-
vestment costs. The resulting optimization problem is expressed in Equation (2.11):
max
CapL,i ,CapH,i
E (pii) = E (λ) ∗ E (Ri) +Cov (λ, Ri)−
 
IW − SUB  CapL,i + CapH,i
(2.11)
With capacity payments renewable investors maximize spot market revenue. For low
renewable targets KT ≤ d− q¯ the expected spot market revenue is higher at location
H because of the higher expected wind generation. Once the installed capacity at
the high wind location is equal to (d − q¯) an additional unit of wind capacity at node
18The mathematical expression for the marginal revenue of wind power investment at nodes H and L
is provided in Equations (2.17) and (2.18) in Appendix 2.5.1.
19Note that 0< ρl < 0.5 because of ρh > ρl so ρl −ρ2l is strictly increasing in ρl .
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H generates expected spot market revenue of c1 (ρh +ρhl) because the conventional
peak-load technology gets crowded out of the market in states h and hl. Investments
at node L on the other hand generate expected spot market revenue of c2ρl + c1ρhl .
Consequently, investors always choose to invest at node L if the following condition
is true:
c2ρl > c1ρh (2.12)
Compared to the feed-in premium system, the condition for developing the low wind
location is less restrictive. By comparing the results with the central planner solu-
tion it can additionally be derived that underdiversification of wind locations is not
possible in a subsidy system with capacity payments.20 Instead, there is overdiver-
sification of wind locations as the market value of wind energy is fully internalized
while grid investment costs are external. Proposition 2.2c summarizes the findings.
Proposition 2.2c. In a system with direct capacity payments investors choose loca-
tions where the highest expected spot market revenue can be generated. As a result,
there is overdiversiversification of wind locations compared to the first-best solution.
Underdiversification of wind locations is not possible.
Proof. See Appendix 2.5.1.
2.2.4 Anticipatory transmission investment
The results of the previous section show that in an unbundled electricity system
inefficiencies can arise due to uncoordinated investment into wind power capacity
and into the grid under all considered subsidy schemes. The possible inefficiencies
are underdiversification of wind locations, which means that potential reductions
in total system costs due to development of additional locations are not used, and
overdiversification of wind locations, which means that wind power investments
enforce inefficient grid extensions. This section analyzes if a proactive transmission
operator can prevent these inefficiencies by anticipating decisions of wind power
investors.
It is assumed that the transmission operator is benevolent and minimizes total sys-
tem costs. Additionally it is assumed that the transmission operator has perfect infor-
mation and knows all relevant parameters of the electricity system. Consequently,
20According to the second part of Proposition 2.1 c2ρl > c1ρh is a necessary but not sufficient condition
for the optimality of developing the low wind location L. However, in a subsidy system with capacity
payments investors always choose to develop location L if this condition is true.
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the transmission operator decides whether to build transmission lines to nodes H
and L based on the grid investment costs and the expected dispatch costs, which re-
sult from private wind power investments in different network configurations. The
objective function of the transmission operator is the same as in the central plan-
ner problem because of the assumed benevolence. The difference to problem (2.6)
is that the transmission operator can not directly influence installed wind power
capacities.
To enable the transmission operator to prevent underdiversification of wind loca-
tions it is assumed that he is able to limit the transfer capacity of a transmission line
once it is built. For reasons of simplification only the limitation of transfer capacity
to the high wind location H is considered.21 Based on these assumptions the opti-
mization problem of the transmission operator is formulated in Equations (2.13a)
to (2.13c). LH represents the limited transfer capacity to node H. E
 
CD
 ·, LH
expresses that the expected dispatch costs are now also influenced by the limited
transfer capacity.22
min
LH ,LL ,LH
CTotal = E
 
CD
 ·, LH+ IW (CapH + CapL) + IG (LH + LL) (2.13a)
s.t. KT = CapH LH + CapL LL (2.13b)
LL , LH ∈ {1, 0} (2.13c)
As discussed in the previous section, two types of inefficiencies can arise depend-
ing on the subsidy scheme for renewable energy, namely underdiversification and
overdiversification of wind locations. As the transmission operator has perfect in-
formation over the electricity system he can anticipate wind power investments and
the resulting inefficiencies. If wind power investors develop too many wind loca-
tions, which is possible in a subsidy system with direct capacity payments or in a
feed-in premium system under the conditions explained in Sections 2.2 and 2.2, the
transmission operator can refuse to connect the low wind location L to the demand
node D. This prevents overdiversification as investors have no incentive to invest
at location L if they know that no transmission line will be built and they can not
generate any revenue at node L. If wind power producers invest only at the high
wind location H despite potential social benefits of developing both wind locations,
the transmission operator can choose to build both transmission lines and force in-
vestors to move to location L by limiting transfer capacity to node H. This prevents
21Including the option to limit transfer capacity to node L into the problem would however not change
the results
22The "·" represents the remaining factors as discussed in Section 2.2.1.
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underdiversification because additional investments above the capacity limit will not
be able to generate positive expected profits. The optimal capacity limit is equal to
(d − q¯), which is the social optimal investment level at node H if diversification of
wind locations is beneficial. Proposition 2.3 summarizes the results.
Proposition 2.3.
(i) If the subsidy scheme for wind power investment incentivizes overdiversification,
the transmission operator chooses not to connect the inferior wind location L.
(ii) If the subsidy scheme for wind power investment incentivizes underdiversification,
the transmission operator connects both locations and limits the transfer capacity
to the superior wind location to (d − q¯), which forces investors to develop both
wind locations.
Proof. See Appendix 2.5.1.
2.2.5 Welfare effects and policy implications
Based on the findings described in Propositions 2.1 to 2.3, this section discusses
welfare effects and derives policy implications. Figure 2.4 summarizes the previous
results graphically. The depiction is analogous to Figure 2.3 and shows expected dis-
patch costs as a function of the capacity target for renewable electricity generation
KT . Additionally, Figure 2.4 shows the model results and the resulting inefficien-
cies in an unbundled system with reactive grid investment compared to the central
planner solution. K∗T indicates the capacity target above which the central planner
develops the low wind location L.
Figure 2.4 shows that for low renewable targets KT ≤ (d − q¯) all support mecha-
nisms lead to the efficient system configuration with only node H developed, which
corresponds to area I . For moderate renewable targets (d − q¯) < KT ≤ K∗T in area
I I , only the feed-in tariff system guarantees the optimal solution, while capacity
payments lead to overdiversification and the feed-in premium system leads to over-
diversification if condition (2.10) holds. For high renewable targets KT > K
∗
T in area
I I I on the other hand, only capacity payments guarantee the efficient system config-
uration, while the feed-in tariff system leads to underdiversification and the feed-in
premium system leads to underdiversification if condition (2.10) is violated.
The resulting inefficiencies can be further analyzed by comparing total system
costs of the central planner solution to a system with under- or overdiversified wind
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Figure 2.4: Overview of possible inefficiencies under different support schemes
locations. The corresponding welfare effects are described by Equations (2.14a) and
(2.14b):
∆W overdiv. = IG − (c2ρl − c1ρh)
 
KT − (d − q¯)
  
for (d − q¯)< KT ≤ K∗T

(2.14a)
∆W underdiv. = (c2ρl − c1ρh)
 
KT − (d − q¯)
− IG  for KT > K∗T  (2.14b)
Equation (2.14a) expresses the welfare loss due to overdiversification of wind loca-
tions. It can be seen that the welfare loss is decreasing in KT and increasing in q¯.
The slope of both effects is higher if the conventional merit order is steep and the
quality difference between the wind locations is small. Additionally it can be seen
that the welfare loss due to overdiversification is limited to IG . Equation (2.14b) ex-
presses the corresponding welfare loss due to underdiversification of wind locations,
which is increasing in KT and decreasing in q¯. Equivalently, these effects are more
pronounced with a steep merit order and a small difference between expected wind
generation at the two locations. The possible welfare loss due to underdiversification
is theoretically unbounded.
In practice, climate policy measures typically include explicit renewable targets as
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well as reductions of emission intensive, for example coal-fired, base-load capacity.23
Hence, the model parameters KT and q¯ are typically directly influenced by policy
makers. As a result, the following policy implications can be derived based on the
discussed welfare effects and the results in Figure 2.4.
First, the choice of the support scheme is uncritical for low renewable targets as
all assessed policies yield the efficient solution with only the best wind location de-
veloped. Second, overdiversification of locations should be of concern for moderate
renewable targets. Consequently a feed-in tariff system may be the best solution.
Alternatively the TSO can act proactively, for example by assigning a limited num-
ber of good wind locations and commit to not connecting additional sites. Third,
market based mechanisms are important for high renewable targets as the value of
diversification of wind locations increases. Consequently, capacity subsidies should
be implemented. Alternatively a feed-in premium system can be optimal if condition
(2.10) is violated. This is however difficult for policy makers to assess in practice
as the development of crucial parameters such as marginal conventional genera-
tion costs or wind power investment costs is subject to major uncertainty. If high
renewable targets are implemented with a feed-in tariff system or a feed-in pre-
mium system and condition (2.10) holds, the TSO can only prevent inefficiencies by
building transmission lines in advance of generation investment and limiting trans-
mission capacity optimally in order to enforce diversification of wind locations. This
is probably difficult to realize in practice as substantial planning efforts are required.
Fourth, politically induced reductions of base load capacity decrease the profitability
of developing both wind locations as more peak load generation can be displaced
by wind power generation from the better wind location. As a result, potential wel-
fare losses due to underdiversification of locations can be dampened. Welfare losses
caused by overdiversification on the other hand are increased by reductions in base
load capacity.24
The discussed policy implications are derived under the assumption of no en-
dogenous changes in conventional power generation capacities. This assumption
is uncritical in the short to medium term because wind power investment has sig-
23Examples for policy measures that directly influence base load capacity are emission standards,
which have been introduced for example in the United States, the European Union, China or India.
Additionally, several countries have directly influenced base load generation capacity by shutting
down coal-fired generation or putting restrictions on investments into new power generation, see
International Energy Agency (2016a). A specific policy that combines the introduction of a feed-in
tariff scheme with shut-downs of coal fired power plants is discussed in Stokes (2013) for the case
of Ontario, Canada.
24Note that regardless of the subsidy mechanism, the expected costs of conventional generation in-
crease due to politically enforced reductions in base load generation capacity.
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nificantly lower lead times compared to conventional power plant investments. In
the long term however, the addition of intermittent wind power capacities is likely
to induce changes in the structure of the conventional power plant fleet, which in
turn influences market based investment into wind power. An analysis of these feed-
back effects is out of the scope of the paper. An extension of the presented model
with endogenous investments into conventional power generation is an interesting
direction for future research.
2.2.6 Numerical analysis
Based on the analysis in the previous section it can be stated that the two main com-
ponents that determine the level of inefficiency described by Equations (2.14a) and
(2.14b) are the grid investment costs IG and the benefit of diversifying locations
(c2ρl − c1ρh)
 
KT − (d − q¯)

. Both components can be substantial in practice. An
analysis of about 250 transmission projects in Europe in Agency for the Cooperation
of Energy Regulators (2015) reports for example median total investment costs of
roughly 1 million EUR per kilometer for 2 circuit overhead transmission lines at 380-
400 kV voltage. Consequently, overdiversification of wind locations can yield sub-
stantial inefficiencies if too many remote wind sites than necessary are developed.
For underground cables the equivalent investment costs are almost 6 million EUR
per kilometer. In countries where underground cables are increasingly discussed
because of public opposition against overhead lines the issue of overdiversification
can be therefore even more pressing. A detailed assessment of the benefit of diver-
sification of wind locations in real-world power systems requires detailed statistical
analysis and modeling and is therefore out of the scope of this paper. However, a
simple estimation based on fuel prices and full load hours of wind power plants in
Germany suggests that the potential benefits can be substantial. Methodology and
results of the analysis are described in this section.
The marginal generation costs of conventional power plants c1 and c2 are assumed
to be 30 EUR/MWh and 60 EUR/MWh which roughly corresponds to the marginal
costs of a coal-fired power plant and an open cycle gas turbine in Europe. The
probabilities for wind power production are determined based on full load hours of
modern wind power plants in northern and southern Germany. 2600 full load hours
for northern Germany as node H and 2100 full load hours for southern Germany
as node L are assumed. The values of ρh and ρl in Equations (2.14a) and (2.14b)
are the probabilities that only one of the two locations produces electricity while
the other does not. Consequently, additional assumptions on the correlation of wind
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power generation at the two locations have to be made. In the model, the correlation
is determined by ρhl , which is the probability that both locations produce at the
same time. In the numerical example an additional state 0 with probability ρ0 and
no wind power production is introduced in order to better reflect real-world wind
power production.
The relevant probabilities are determined based on a simple logic: When assum-
ing the maximum negative correlation based on the real-world full load hours there
are 2600 hours of wind production only at node H and 2100 hours of wind pro-
duction only at node L while the hours of parallel wind production at both nodes
are 0. With 8760 hour per year, the corresponding probabilities are ρh = 0.297,
ρl = 0.24 and ρhl = 0. If the maximum positive correlation is assumed, there are
2100 hours of parallel production and 500 hours of production only at node H. The
corresponding probabilities are ρh = 0.057, ρl = 0 and ρhl = 0.479. The proba-
bilities between the two explained extreme cases are scaled linearly based on the
ratio between full load hours at nodes H and L. The benefit of diversification is then
calculated based on Equations (2.14a) and (2.14b) with (c2ρl − c1ρh) ∗ 8760. The
result can be interpreted as the yearly benefit of building one MW of wind power
capacity at the low wind location L instead of the high wind location H for renew-
able targets KT > d − q¯. The results are depicted in Figure 2.5 as a function of the
correlation coefficient between wind generation at nodes H and L. The correlation
coefficient is calculated with the corresponding values for ρh, ρl and ρhl .
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Figure 2.5: Yearly benefit of diversification in the numerical example
Figure 2.5 shows that there is no benefit of diversifying wind locations for high
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correlations. The break even for diversification is at a correlation of 0.66. For the ex-
treme case of maximum negative correlation the benefit of diversification increases
to almost 50000 EUR/MW per year. An analysis of real-world correlation between
wind power generation in the different federal states in Germany is conducted in
Hagspiel (2018). The analysis shows that the real-world correlation is in a range
between 0.1 and 0.77 with a mean of 0.48. The feasible range is indicated by the
dashed lines in Figure 2.5. Additionally, the dotted line indicates the mean correla-
tion. It can be seen that the potential yearly benefit of diversification is at roughly
10000 EUR/MW for the mean correlation and 30000 EUR/MW for the minimum
correlation. The negative value for the maximum correlation shows that diversifica-
tion is not necessarily beneficial but depends on the specific wind conditions at the
given locations.
The numerical analysis shows, that there can be substantial benefits of diversifica-
tion in real-world power systems. However, the presented example can only give a
first indication. A detailed analysis for real-world power systems with different sup-
ply curves of conventional generation and different wind conditions is a promising
direction for future research.
2.3 Model extensions
After the basic results and implications of the model have been discussed, this section
introduces extensions that give additional insights on the coordination problem be-
tween subsidized renewable energy investments and grid investments in unbundled
electricity systems.
2.3.1 Asymmetric grid investment costs
Throughout Section 2.2 symmetric investment costs for grid investments are as-
sumed, which means that investments costs for transmission lines to nodes H and
node L are equal. In reality, the required costs to integrate different wind location
into the electricity system can vary substantially based on factors such as the distance
to load centers or effects on bottlenecks within the system. Introducing asymmetric
investment costs for grid extensions does not change the dispatch problem nor the
investment problem of wind power producers. However, the first-best benchmark
solution of the central planner and the transmission investment problem are differ-
ent. The main difference to the solutions presented in Section 2.2 is that connecting
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only node L is not dominated by connecting only node H.25
As a result, additional inefficiencies can occur when the transmission line to the
high wind location H is more costly than the transmission line to the low wind lo-
cation L. In this case it is preferable to connect only node L if the higher expected
wind output at node H does not justify the additional grid investment costs. If wind
power investors move first they will however prefer the better wind location H and
therefore force the transmission operator to build the more costly transmission line.
Analogous to Section 2.2 a perfectly regulated and perfectly informed transmission
operator can implement the first best solution by anticipating investment decisions of
wind power producers and building the optimal network configuration proactively.
The mathematical formulation of the central planner problem with asymmetric grind
investment costs is provided in Appendix 2.5.2.
The case of asymmetric grid investment costs has practical relevance because in
existing electricity systems there are typically suitable areas for wind power produc-
tion close to demand centers or existing grid infrastructure which can be integrated
at comparably low costs. The areas with the best wind properties on the other hand
are often remote and are thus costly to connect to the existing infrastructure. Lamy
et al. (2016) show for example that developing the best wind locations in the United
States could be inefficient if transmission extensions are included in the assessment.
Similarly, Wu et al. (2014) argue that the renewable support mechanism in China
incentivized large wind power investments in central China, where the best wind
locations are located. However, these areas are far away from the coastal industrial
demand centers and therefore costly to connect to the existing grid infrastructure.
As a result up to a third of the installed wind power capacity in China is idle and
lacks proper grid connection. Against the backdrop of these practical examples the
present theoretical analysis underlines the importance of a well designed regulatory
framework that coordinates private wind power investment and grid extensions.
2.3.2 Imperfect regulation
The results in Section 2.2 are based on the assumption of benevolent behavior of
the transmission operator as a result of perfect regulation. In reality transmission
companies are not perfectly regulated and follow their own agenda inside the reg-
25Note that a setting with two nodes where demand is located at one node and wind power investment
is possible at both nodes can be modeled by setting grid investment costs for the connection to node
H or node L to zero. The two node setting is therefore a special case of the three node model with
asymmetric grid investment costs.
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ulatory constraints. Depending on the regulatory system incentives to overinvest
or underinvest compared to the socially optimal network configuration can emerge.
Regulatory systems that incentivize overinvestment according to standard economic
theory are cost-plus and rate-of-return regulation.26 Under rate-of-return regulation
the transmission operator is allowed to recover investment costs and to earn an ad-
ditional rate of return which is set by the regulator. In the analyzed model a revenue
maximizing transmission operator under rate of return regulation profits from build-
ing transmission lines to both wind locations. Hence, given the decision variables
from Section 2.2.4, the transmission operator can limit the transfer capacity to node
H to a value below the renewable target KT in order to force wind power investors
to develop both locations in all considered subsidy systems.27 Proactive behavior
therefore enables the transmission operator to always build both transmission lines
and earn the guaranteed revenue.
An example for a regulatory system that incentivizes underinvestment is price-
cap regulation with no adjustments of the cap based on the investment activity of
the transmission operator.28 In such a regulatory system the transmission operator
would try to build as little transmission capacities as possible. Assuming that the
transmission operator acts proactively and is obliged to enable the realization of
the renewable target, it would be optimal to connect only one wind location. With
symmetric grid investment costs, the transmission operator is indifferent between
locations. With asymmetric investment costs he connects only the location with
lower grid investment costs.
The two examples show that imperfect regulation can lead to substantial ineffi-
ciencies in grid investment when the transmission operator invests proactively in an
unbundled electricity system. A more detailed analysis of the impact of different reg-
ulatory regimes on the coordination problem between renewable energy investment
and grid investment is left for further research.
26See for example Averch and Johnson (1962).
27It is assumed that the transmission operator is not able to connect a location where no wind power
capacity will be built in the second stage. Therefore he has to limit transfer capacity in order to
steer investments.
28For a detailed discussion of the effects of price-cap regulation on investment behavior see for example
Laffont and Tirole (1993). Modern regulatory systems based on incentive and yardstick regulation
can also be seen as a type of price-cap regulation where the price-cap is revised regularly based on
industry benchmarks, see Joskow (2014). A comparison of rate-of-return and price-cap regulation
can be found in Liston (1993).
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2.3.3 G-component
One of the main results of Section 2.2 is that wind power investors do not necessar-
ily choose system optimal locations for their investments. Additionally it has been
shown that proactive behavior of a benevolent transmission operator leads to the
optimal system configuration, which is however only applicable under perfect regu-
lation. An alternative approach to directly influence the investment behavior of wind
power investors is a location-dependent g-component. A g-component is a network
charge which is set by the regulator and paid by power generators for the electrical
energy they feed into the grid. This section analyzes if such a charge can be set
to a level that reflects the impact of investments into new generation capacity on
overall system costs, leading to an internalization of the external effects of private
investments.
A g-component is not applicable in a feed-in-tariff system because the lack of mar-
ket signals for investors does not incentivize diversification of locations. Therefore
a g-component could only shift investments entirely from the high wind location to
the low wind location. In feed-in premium systems however, a g-component can
alter the relationship between the revenue generated from spot market sales and
fixed premium payments which determines the profitability of diversification for in-
vestors. Consequently, a g-component can adjust the investment problem of private
investors, formulated in Equation (2.9) in order to harmonize it with Proposition
2.1.
Assuming that developing the low wind location is socially inefficient, the regu-
lator can choose to charge a g-component at location L in order to deincentivize
private investments. By introducing the g-component GL into Equation (2.9) and
combining it with Proposition 2.1, the following lower bound for GL can be derived:
GL ≥ I
G 
KT − (d − q¯)

(ρl +ρlh)
− (ρh −ρl) ∗ F I P
(ρl +ρlh)
(2.15)
The first term in Equation (2.15) shows that the g-component introduces the grid
investment costs as well as the renewable target KT into the maximization problem
of wind power investors. The minimum value of GL increases with I
G and decreases
with KT because the social costs of developing the low wind location L are high if
the connection is costly and if only small amounts of wind power capacity are built
at node L, which still require the full lumpy grid investment. The second term in
Equation (2.15) results from the higher fixed premium payments at node H and
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reduces the lower bound for GL .
A lower bound for GH in order to incentivize investments at node L can be derived
analogously, the results are provided in Appendix 2.5.2. Similarly to the feed-in
premium case, a g-component can be used to steer locational choices of private
investors in a subsidy system with direct capacity payments. The resulting lower
bound for GL to prevent potential overdiversification can be obtained by setting
F I P to zero in the solution of the feed-in premium case. Underdiversification of
wind locations is not possible in a system with direct capacity payments as shown in
Section 2.2.
2.4 Conclusion
This article analyzes interactions between the locational choice of private wind power
investors in unbundled electricity systems under different subsidy schemes and the
required grid investments to integrate the wind power capacity into the system. I
find that private investors do not choose system optimal wind locations in feed-in
tariff schemes, feed-in premium schemes and subsidy systems with direct capacity
payments. In feed-in tariff schemes inefficiencies result from the lack of internal-
ization of the market value of the produced electricity into investment decisions.
Under feed-in premium schemes and capacity subsidies the market value is inter-
nalized, but the system integration costs are not. Consequently, all three subsidy
systems can result in inefficient system configurations if the transmission operator
follows wind power investments.
The described inefficiencies can be prevented if a benevolent transmission opera-
tor anticipates investment decisions of private investors and steers investment in a
system optimal way. Consequently, anticipative transmission investment can help to
efficiently integrate generation capacities based on renewable energy sources into
electricity systems. However, benevolent behavior is only applicable under perfect
regulation. In absence of perfect regulation, incentives to implement the system
configuration that maximizes the profit of the transmission operator inside the regu-
latory constraints arise. A possibility to directly influence investment decisions of pri-
vate investors by internalizing the system integration costs are location-dependent
grid charges for power producers.
The results of the analysis show that support schemes for renewable electricity
generation should be designed with awareness for the consequences on the loca-
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tional choice of investors. In addition, policy makers should assign a more active role
to transmission operators, which acknowledges the importance of anticipative in-
vestment behavior. However, inefficient steering of renewable investments by trans-
mission companies as a result of imperfect regulation should be of concern. Finally it
is shown that power systems which internalize not only the market value of electric-
ity but also the location-dependent integration costs for generation capacities into
private investment decisions should be designed.
In future work, the model can be extended with more complex representations of
stochastic wind generation. Another possibility for further research is an application
of the model with real-world power systems in order to quantify the inefficiencies of
uncoordinated renewable energy and grid investments. Also an extension with en-
dogenous investment into conventional generation, multiple renewable technologies
or the introduction of incomplete information of the transmission operator regarding
the quality of wind locations are promising additions.
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2.5 Appendix
2.5.1 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2.1.
The problem can be solved by comparing the different network configurations. LL =
0 enforces LH = 1 and CapH = KT . LH = 0 enforces LL = 1 and CapL = KT . If
LL = 1 and LH = 1, CapH + CapL = KT follows. LH = 0 and LL = 0 can be
immediately ruled out because of KT > 0.
For KT ≤ (d − q¯), ∂ E(CD)∂ CapH < ∂ E(CD)∂ CapL holds because of ρh > ρl . It follows that LL = 1
and CapL > 0 is never optimal, which is equivalent to the first part of Proposition
2.1.
For KT > (d − q¯) several cases have to be compared. Because E (CD) is piece-
wise linear and strictly decreasing in KH and KL the optimal solution must be ei-
ther CapH = KT and CapL = 0, CapH = 0 and CapL = KT , CapH = d − q¯ and
CapL = KT − (d − q¯) or CapH = KT − (d − q¯) and CapL = (d − q¯). Because of
ρh > ρl the solution CapH = KT and CapL = 0 dominates CapH = 0 and CapL = KT
and CapH = d − q¯ and CapL = KT − (d − q¯) dominates CapH = KT − (d − q¯) and
CapL = (d − q¯) for KT ≤ 2 (d − q¯). Plugging the remaining candidates for the cost
minimum into Equations (2.4) and (2.6a) and comparing the results yields the sec-
ond part of Proposition 2.1 after some reformulation.
Proof of Proposition 2.2a.
Plugging Equations (2.3a), (2.3b) and (2.3c) into Equation (2.7a) and taking the
first derivative with respect to KH and KL yields
∂ E(pii)
∂ KH
>
∂ E(pii)
∂ KL
because of ρh > ρl .
LH = 1 and LL = 1 can be assumed for reactive behavior of the transmission operator
as transmission lines are built according to wind power investment.
Proof of Proposition 2.2b.
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Equation (2.8a) can be reformulated as follows with KA,i = KH,i + KL,i:
E (pii) =

(F I P + c1)
 
ρhKH,i +ρl KL,i +ρhl KA,i
− IW KA,i
if
∑
i
KH,i > d − q¯,
∑
i
KL,i > d − q¯
(F I P + c2)ρl KL,i + (F I P + c1)
 
ρhKH,i +ρhl KA,i
− IW KA,i
if
∑
i
KH,i > d − q¯,
∑
i
KL,i ≤ d − q¯
(F I P + c2)ρhKH,i + (F I P + c1)
 
ρl KL,i +ρhl KA,i
− IW KA,i
if
∑
i
KH,i ≤ d − q¯,
∑
i
KL,i > d − q¯
(F I P + c2)
 
ρhKH,i +ρl KL,i

+ (F I P + c1)ρhl KA,i − IW KA,i
if
∑
i
KH,i ≤ d − q¯,
∑
i
KL,i ≤ d − q¯,
∑
i
KA,i > d − q¯
(F I P + c2)
 
ρhKH,i +ρl KL,i +ρhl KA,i
− IW KA,i
if
∑
i
KH,i ≤ d − q¯,
∑
i
KL,i ≤ d − q¯,
∑
i
KA,i ≤ d − q¯
(2.16)
The partial derivatives with respect to KH,i and KL,i are:
∂ E (pii)
∂ KH,i
=

(F I P + c1) (ρh +ρhl)− IW if ∑i KH,i > d − q¯
(F I P + c2)ρh + (F I P + c1)ρhl − IW if ∑i KH,i ≤ d − q¯, ∑i KA,i > d − q¯
(F I P + c2) (ρh +ρhl)− IW if ∑i KH,i ≤ d − q¯, ∑i KA,i ≤ d − q¯
(2.17)
∂ E (pii)
∂ KL,i
=

(F I P + c1) (ρl +ρhl)− IW if ∑i KL,i > d − q¯
(F I P + c2)ρl + (F I P + c1)ρhl − IW if ∑i KL,i ≤ d − q¯, ∑i KA,i > d − q¯
(F I P + c2) (ρl +ρhl)− IW if ∑i KL,i ≤ d − q¯, ∑i KA,i ≤ d − q¯
(2.18)
Because of the assumption of free market entry, investors develop the locations in
descending order of marginal revenue. For KT ≤ (d − q¯), ∂ E(pii)∂ KH,i > ∂ E(pii)∂ KL,i holds and
CapL > 0 is never optimal. For KT > (d − q¯), comparing (2.17) and (2.18) yields
Equation (2.9).
Proof of Proposition 2.2c.
The capacity subsidy is equivalent to a reduction of the investment costs for wind
power IW . Consequently, the optimal solution can be derived analogously to Propo-
sition 2.2b with F I P = 0.
Proof of Proposition 2.3.
LH = 1 and LL = 0 implements CapH = KT and CapL = 0, the first part of Proposi-
tion 2.3 follows.
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If the transmission operator decides to limit transfer capacity LH two cases can
be distinguished. If CapH ≤ LH the decision problem for renewable investors is
unchanged compared to Propositions 2.2a, 2.2b and 2.2c. For CapH > LH , the
marginal revenue ∂ E(pii)∂ CapH,i equals −IW , so CapH ≤ LH in the competitive case. In the
monopolistic case, CapH,i can be substituted by LH in the definition of the five cases
in Equation (2.16). Comparing this adjusted Equation (2.16) with CapH = LH to
CapH > LH shows that E
 
pii
 
CapH = LH
 
> E
 
pii
 
CapH > LH
 
. Consequently
the transmission operator chooses LH = 1, LL = 1 and LH = (d − q¯) if it is optimal
according to Proposition 2.1.
2.5.2 Extensions
Asymmetric grid investment costs
Introducing asymmetric investment costs leads to the following expression for total
system costs:
CTotal = E (CD) + I
W (CapH + CapL) + I
G
H ∗ LH + IGL ∗ LL (2.19)
For KT ≤ d − q¯ connecting both nodes H and L is dominated by connecting only
node H because it is always preferable to build all wind power capacity at the better
wind location H when both nodes are connected. Comparing the two possible out-
comes for connecting one wind location leads to the condition in Equation (2.20)
for developing the low wind location.
c2 (ρh −ρl)KT > IGH − IGL (2.20)
For renewable targets KT > d − q¯ all three possible network configurations have to
be considered. Comparing the outcomes for the configurations with only one of the
wind locations connected to the demand node D leads to Equation (2.21a). Equa-
tion (2.21b) gives the condition for lower system costs when both wind nodes are
connected compared to only node H connected, Equation (2.21c) gives the condi-
tion for lower system costs when both wind nodes are connected compared to only
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node L connected.
(ρh −ρl)

c1
 
KT − (d − q¯)

+ c2 (d − q¯)

> IGH − IGL (2.21a)
(c2ρl − c1ρh)
 
KT − (d − q¯)

> IGL (2.21b)
(c2 − c1)ρl
 
KT − (d − q¯)

+ c2 (ρh −ρl) (d − q¯)> IGH (2.21c)
Additional expressions for g-component
Introducing GH into Equation (2.9) and combining it with Proposition 2.1 yields:
GH ≥ (ρh −ρl) ∗ F I P(ρh +ρlh) −
IG 
KT − (d − q¯)

(ρh +ρlh)
(2.22)
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3 Distributed Generation in Unbundled
Electricity Markets
Electricity systems are increasingly characterized by distributed generation technolo-
gies, e.g. rooftop photovoltaic systems, which are used by end consumers to directly
produce electricity. Additionally, empirical evidence suggests that electricity retail-
ers exercise market power in many unbundled electricity markets. Against this back-
drop this articles analyzes the impact of distributed generation on imperfect retail
markets for electricity in a spatial competition framework. I find that distributed
generation puts competitive pressure on retailers and induces lower retail prices.
Therefore even consumers who do not use distributed generation benefit. Based on
this effect regulators can shift welfare to consumers by subsidizing distributed gen-
eration in order to position it as a competitor to grid-based electricity. However, if
only a limited share of demand can be supplied with distributed generation, there is
a point at which retailers disregard the substitutable share of demand and focus on
the non-substitutable consumption in order to realize higher mark-ups. As a result,
increased subsidies for distributed generation can increase retail prices and harm
consumers. With optimal subsidies this strategy of retailers is prevented by limiting
usage of distributed generation.
3.1 Introduction
Electricity markets are increasingly influenced by distributed generation technolo-
gies such as rooftop photovoltaic systems, small-scale combined heat and power
plants or wind turbines, which are used by end consumers to directly produce elec-
tricity.1 End consumers use distributed generation to substitute grid-based electric-
ity, which is produced in large-scale power plants and transported to consumers
via transmission and distribution infrastructure. This development is also refereed
to under the term "prosumage", which indicates that households or businesses are
at the same time consumers and producers of electricity. Conceptually the choice
1A general discussion of distributed generation in electricity markets is provided in Pepermans et al.
(2005).
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whether to consume grid-based electricity or produce electricity from distributed
generation can be compared to "make-or-buy" or "do-it-yourself" decisions which
are present in many markets.2
In most cases distributed generation is currently not competitive to centralized
large-scale electricity production. However, especially distributed generation tech-
nologies based on renewable energy sources often receive financial support either
via direct subsides such as feed-in tariffs or via indirect support mechanisms. Indi-
rect subsidization is typically a result of exemption rules which exempt distributed
generation from tax or grid fee payments, which both account for a significant share
of the total cost of grid-based electricity in practice.3 Consumers compare the subsi-
dized cost of distributed generation to the price of grid-based electricity when they
decide on becoming a "prosumer". Therefore direct subsidy payments, exemption
rules and the prices charged by retailers are key drivers for the adoption of dis-
tributed generation.
In the course of the liberalization and restructuring of electricity markets over the
last decades, many retail markets for electricity in the United States and the Eu-
ropean Union have been unbundled and organized competitively.4 In competitive
retail markets, consumers can choose between different retailers depending on their
individual preference. Despite this possibility, empirical evidence indicates that only
a small share of customers switches retailers in many of the restructured markets and
in particular local retailers can realize substantial margins.5 One possible explana-
tion for these margins are strong consumer preferences towards specific suppliers as
a result of risk aversion, imperfect information or advertising activities.6
Against the described backdrop this paper analyzes the impact of distributed gen-
eration on retail markets for electricity with imperfect competition. Based on this
analysis, optimal regulatory strategies with respect to subsidies for distributed gen-
eration and grid fees are evaluated. The analysis builds on a standard Hotelling
2See for example Sappington (2005).
3The average total household electricity price in the European Union consisted of 27% network
charges, 25% taxes and 13% charges for renewable energy support. See Agency for the Coop-
eration of Energy Regulators and Council of European Energy Regulators (2016).
4Retail competition is mandatory in the European Union. In the United States roughly half of the
states introduced retail competition. See International Energy Agency (2016b) for an overview.
5See Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators and Council of European Energy Regulators
(2016) for an overview of retail mark-ups in European electricity markets. A similar analysis for
Texas can be found in Puller and West (2013).
6See Defeuilley (2009) for a discussion of possible drivers of low switching rates and high margins.
Empirical analyses can be found for example in Hortaçsu et al. (2017) for Texas, He and Reiner
(2017) for Britain, Yang (2014) for Denmark, Duso and Szücs (2017) for Germany, Daglish (2016)
for New Zealand or Shin and Managi (2017) for Japan.
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spatial competition framework in order to capture market power of retailers as a
consequence of heterogeneous consumer preferences.7 Consumers may choose dis-
tributed generation as an alternative to grid-based electricity purchased from retail-
ers. However, only a limited share of total demand can be supplied with distributed
generation, which means that some electricity is always received from retailers. This
assumption reflects that not every consumer is able to use distributed generation and
full autarky from the grid is very costly or even impossible with available technolo-
gies.
The analysis shows, that the availability of distributed generation increases com-
petition in the retail market. Hence, as soon as distributed generation is competitive
to grid-based electricity, retailers adjust prices and reduce mark-ups. The regulator
can exploit this behaviour by subsidizing distributed generation in order to position it
as a competitor to grid-based electricity, which reduces market power of retailers and
shifts producer rents to consumers. As retail prices are reduced for all consumption,
this strategy benefits also consumers who are unable to use distributed generation.
However, there is a point where retailers discard the share of electricity consump-
tion which can be substituted with distributed generation and prefer to serve only
non-substitutable demand with high mark-ups. As a result, increasing subsidies for
distributed generation increases retail prices and therefore harms consumers if retail-
ers discard the substitutable share of demand. Additionally it is shown that optimal
subsidization can be realized with grid fee exemptions. However, optimal subsidies
can only be implemented with a two-part tariff structure. Grid fee exemptions with
volumetric tariffs are not applicable to implement the optimal regulatory strategy.
The paper is mainly related to two literature streams. The first relevant liter-
ature stream examines distributed generation technologies in electricity markets.
The majority of papers within this stream focuses on numerical simulations or gen-
eral discussions.8 Formal analyses of distributed generation are scarce. Brown and
Sappington (2017b) build a theoretical model to assess optimal compensation for
distributed generation. They find that the optimal policy varies depending on the
available instruments and the type of distributed generation technology. However,
capacity charges are crucial in order to induce efficient investment into distributed
generation. In Brown and Sappington (2017a) this analysis is extended in a very
similar model framework in order to analyze net metering policies for small-scale
solar power generation. They conclude that the optimal payment for distributed
7This model class was first presented in Hotelling (1929).
8Simulation studies on the impact of distributed generation can be found for example in Eid et al.
(2014), Darghouth et al. (2016) or Munoz-Alvarez et al. (2018).
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generation should reflect changes in conventional generation, distribution and net-
work management costs as well as external effects such as environmental benefits.
However, a net metering mandate is unlikely to meet these requirements. In both
analyses the value chain of electricity supply is assumed to be vertically integrated,
which means that unbundling and imperfect retail markets are not considered. Gau-
tier et al. (2018) analyze interactions between distributed generation and grid in-
frastructure in a theoretical framework. They find that support of distributed gen-
eration via net metering overencourages investment into distributed generation and
that consumers without access to distributed generation technologies cross subsidize
distributed generation investments. The retail market is assumed to be perfectly
competitive in their analysis.
The second relevant literature stream consists of applications of spatial competi-
tion models. On the one hand the paper is related to models of spatial competition
with outside goods, which were first conceptualized in Salop (1979). This model
class has been applied for example in Balasubramanian (1998) or Nakayama (2009)
to analyze the impact of mail order businesses on traditional retail shops. On the
other hand the paper is related to applications of spatial competition frameworks in
an energy context. Tode (2016) assesses energy efficiency measures in a model with
imperfect competition and imperfect consumer information. Retail markets for elec-
tricity with switching costs are analyzed in Ruiz et al. (2015). Distributed generation
is not part of the analysis.
In summary the contribution of the paper is threefold. First, distributed gener-
ation in unbundled electricity markets is analyzed in a theoretical model with an
explicit representation of imperfect competition in the retail market. Second, op-
timal regulatory strategies and subsidy mechanisms are assessed within this model
framework. Third, the impact of distributed generation on recovery of grid costs is
evaluated.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the
basic model setup. Section 3.3 analyzes the retail market problem. Building on
that, Section 3.4 analyzes optimal subsidies for distributed generation. In Section
3.5, grid fee exemption rules and the impact of the share of electricity demand that
can be substituted with distributed generation are discussed as model extensions.
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3.2 Model setup
We consider an electricity market with two symmetric retailers R1 and R2, who sell
electricity to consumers. Two types of consumers are differentiated: a mass α of con-
sumers Cs, who can substitute grid-based electricity consumption with distributed
generation and a mass 2 − α of consumers Cns, who are unable to use distributed
generation. This differentiation reflects two practical issues. First, some consumers
are unable to use distributed generation for example because of financial, legal or
constructional restrictions. Second, even consumers who use distributed genera-
tion, typically maintain a grid connection and use both grid-based and self generated
electricity. This is especially the case for distributed generation based on weather-
dependent renewable energy sources such as wind or solar, where grid-based elec-
tricity is used as a back-up when wind and solar generation is unavailable. Conse-
quently α can be interpreted as the share of demand of consumers who are unable
to use distributed generation as well as the share of electricity demand that can not
be substituted because of unavailability of distributed generation for example dur-
ing the night. In the basic model, α = 1 is assumed. The basic model results are
generalized in Section 3.5.2.
Retailers maximize profits by buying electricity in a wholesale market at price w
and selling it to consumers at retail prices pR1 and pR2. Retailers are assumed to be
price takers in the wholesale market. Additionally retailers are horizontally differen-
tiated and consumers have heterogeneous preferences towards retailers. To model
consumer preferences and horizontal differentiation a spatial competition frame-
work is applied, where parameter t represents the degree of differentiation. Retail-
ers are not able to discriminate prices. Therefore, they always charge the same retail
price for both consumer groups Cs and Cns. The cost of electricity production with
distributed generation technologies is cDG .
9 Additionally a subsidy σ is in place that
reduces the effective costs of distributed generation for end consumers. The subsidy
is set by a benevolent regulator. It is assumed that that cDG −σ ≥ w, which means
that the subsidized cost of distributed generation exceeds the wholesale price for
electricity.
The dynamic structure of the model consist of three stages. In the first stage,
the regulator sets subsidies for distributed generation σ. In the second stage, the
9The model considers only one period of electricity production and consumption. A differentiation
between fixed and variable costs is not required due to this simplification. Hence, w and cDG can
be interpreted as the total specific costs of wholesale electricity and distributed generation over the
model period.
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two retailers R1 and R2 set retail prices in order to maximize profits. In the third
stage, consumers choose between retailers and distributed generation. The dynamic
structure of the model is depicted graphically in Figure 3.1. The model is solved by
backward induction. The retail market is considered first, followed by the regulator
problem.
Consumers choose
between retailers and
distributed generation
Regulator sets
subsidy 𝜎
t=1 t=2 t=3
Retailers 𝑅ଵ and 𝑅ଶ set
𝑝ோଵ and  𝑝ோଶ
Figure 3.1: Dynamic model setting
3.3 The retail market
3.3.1 Consumer problem
Consumers Cns and Cs are assumed to be uniformly distributed along two separate
Hotelling lines with a normalized length of one.10 The two symmetric retailers R1
and R2 are located at the endpoints of both lines. The distance between the retailers
represents horizontal differentiation and consumers are located at a location along
the line according to their preference towards the retailers. The position of con-
sumers Cns is denoted by xns ∈ [0, 1] and the position of consumers Cs is denoted
by xs ∈ [0,1]. Every consumer receives a fixed utility v from consuming one unit
of electricity. It is assumed that v is sufficiently large such that consumers always
choose to consume electricity, which means that total electricity demand is perfectly
inelastic. Because of α = 1 demand of consumers Cs and Cns is normalized to one
in the basic model.
Depending on which retailer consumers choose, they pay a retail price pR1 or
pR2 for electricity consumed from the grid. Additionally, consumers have costs t x
for consumption from retailer R1 and t(x − 1) for consumption from retailer R2
depending on their position 0≤ x ≤ 1. These costs can be interpreted as a disutility
for consumers who cannot choose a retailer that perfectly matches their preferences.
10The chosen model structure with two separate Hotelling lines that differentiate two groups of con-
sumers is similar to the model presented in Ze¯gners and Kretschmer (2016).
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Consumers Cs can substitute grid-based electricity with distributed generation. The
subsidized cost of distributed generation is cDG −σ.
Formally the net utility consumers Cns and Cs derive from grid-based electricity
consumption purchased via retailer Ri can be described by Equation (3.1a), where
x i represents the position of retailer i.
11 The respective net utility from usage of
distributed generation is described by Equation (3.1b):
Ugrid = v − pRi − t |x i − x | (3.1a)
UDG = v − (cDG −σ) (3.1b)
As consumers Cns are unable to use distributed generation, their net utility Uns of
grid-based electricity consumption is directly described by Equation (3.1a). Because
v is sufficiently large by assumption, this utility is strictly positive and consumers Cns
always consume grid-based electricity. Consumers Cs on the other hand compare net
utility from grid-based electricity to net utility from distributed generation. The net
utility Us of grid-based electricity consumption for consumers Cs can therefore be de-
termined by the difference between Equations (3.1a) and (3.1b). Us is only positive
if the subsidized cost of distributed generation exceeds the sum of retail price and
preference dependent disutility. Otherwise net utility from grid-based consumption
is negative and consumers Cs use distributed generation to directly produce electric-
ity. The formal expressions for Uns and Us are presented in Equations (3.2a) and
(3.2b):
Uns = v − pRi − t |x i − xns| (3.2a)
Us = cDG −σ− pRi − t |x i − xs| (3.2b)
Based on Equations (3.2a) and (3.2b) the demand served by each retailer i can be
derived by solving for the indifferent consumer between purchasing from retailers
R1 or R2 and for the indifferent consumer Cs between using grid-based electricity or
11In the following i ∈ {1, 2} is used to symbolize retailers 1 and 2 in order to simplify notation. −i
stands for the corresponding other retailer.
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distributed generation respectively. The following demand function can be derived:
qRi =

t + pR−i − pRi
t
if pR−i − t ≤ pRi ≤ 2(cDG −σ)− pR−i − t
t + pR−i − pRi
2t
+
cDG −σ− pRi
t
if 2(cDG −σ)− pR−i − t ≤ pRi ≤ cDG −σ
t + pR−i − pRi
2t
if pRi > cDG −σ
(3.3)
Equation (3.3) shows that three cases can be distinguished for the demand function.
In the first case, distributed generation is not competitive to grid-based consumption
for all consumers. As a result, demand from retailers depends only on retail prices
and the preference dependent disutility for consumers. The subsidies for distributed
generation are irrelevant as all consumption is grid-based. In the second case, dis-
tributed generation is used by some consumers Cs. Consequently, retailers compete
against distributed generation for the substitutable share of electricity demand. For
this share, demand depends on the relationship between the subsidized cost of dis-
tributed generation cDG−σ and the retail price pRi . The non-substitutable consump-
tion is still determined by competition between the retailers. In the third case, all
substitutable demand is covered with distributed generation and retailers compete
for consumers Cns. The subsidized cost of distributed generation cDG − σ directly
effects the demand function only in the second case. However, changes in cDG −σ
shift the boundaries between the three cases of the demand functions. An increase
in the subsidy for example shifts the boundaries to lower levels and enlarges the
relative size of the second case of the demand function. The demand for distributed
generation is determined by the residual qD = 2− qR1 − qR2 in all three cases.
3.3.2 Retailer problem
The two retailers buy electricity in the wholesale market at an exogenous wholesale
price w. They are located at the endpoints of the Hotelling lines and are assumed
to maximize profits piR1 and piR2. Retailers set retail prices pR1 and pR2 according to
Problem (3.4). Quantities sold to consumers qRi are determined by Equation (3.3).
max
pRi
piRi = qRi ∗ (pRi −w) (3.4)
Retailer profits depend on the different cases of the demand function, which means
that profits differ if a retailer serves both consumer groups Cns and Cs or if he focuses
only on consumption that can not be substituted with distributed generation. Based
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on the demand function four different cases have to be distinguished in order to
solve the retailer problem. These cases are illustrated graphically in Figure 3.2.
∗
஽ீ
ோଵ ோଶ
(a)
∗
஽ீ
ோଵ ோଶ
(b)
஽ீ
ଵ஽∗ ଶ஽∗
ோଵ ோଶ
(c)
஽ீ
ோଵ ோଶ
(d)
Figure 3.2: Exemplary relations between retail price and cost of distributed generation
Figure 3.2 shows the total cost of grid-based electricity consumption depending on
the location xs of consumers Cs in comparison to the subsidized cost of distributed
generation cDG−σ. In the first case, depicted in Figure 3.2(a), the cost of distributed
generation exceeds the sum of retail prices and preference dependent disutility for
all xs. As a result, all consumers use grid-based electricity and choose the retailer
which is closest to their preference. Demand is determined by the first case of Equa-
tion (3.3). In Figure 3.2(b) distributed generation has reached a cost level at which
a marginal reduction would yield it competitive for consumers with the largest pref-
erence dependent disutility, which are located in the middle of the Hotelling line.
Again all consumers use grid-based electricity, however with a marginal cost reduc-
tion, some consumers would start to use it and demand would be determined by
the second case of Equation (3.3). In the third case according to Figure 3.2(c),
distributed generation is the preferred option for some consumers. Consequently,
consumers located between x∗1D and x∗2D avoid grid-based electricity consumption
by using distributed generation. Demand is described by the second part of Equa-
tion (3.3). In the fourth case, depicted in Figure 3.2(d), distributed generation is
cheaper for all consumers and the substitutable electricity consumption is entirely
supplied with distributed generation. Usage of grid-based electricity is determined
by the third case of Equation (3.3).
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Based on the first order conditions derived from Equation (3.4) the following re-
action function can be obtained:12
pRi(pR−i) =

t + pR−i + w
2
if pR−i − t ≤ pRi ≤ 2(cDG −σ)− pR−i − t
t + pR−i + 3w+ 2(cDG −σ)
6
if 2(cDG −σ)− pR−i − t ≤ pRi ≤ cDG −σ
t + pR−i + w
2
if pRi > cDG −σ
(3.5)
Expressing the boundary conditions between the first and the second case of Equa-
tion (3.5) in terms of pR−i yields the following equations:
pR−i ≤ 4(cDG −σ)−w− 3t3 := p
′
R−i (3.6a)
pR−i >
10(cDG −σ)− 3w− 7t
7
:= p′′R−i (3.6b)
Because p′′R−i is strictly larger than p′R−i for cDG −σ > w there is a region between
p′R−i and p′′R−i where the best response is not defined by the three cases of Equation
(3.5). In this region ∂ piRi∂ pRi is strictly positive for pRi < 2(cDG − σ) − pR−i − t and
strictly negative for pRi > 2(cDG −σ)− pR−i − t. As a result, the optimal reaction is
pRi = 2(cDG −σ)− pR−i − t, which is exactly the boundary between cases 1 and 2 of
Equation (3.5).13
Expressing the boundary conditions between the second and the third case of
Equation (3.5) in terms of pR−i yields the following equations:
pR−i ≤ 4(cDG −σ)− 3w− t := p′′′R−i (3.7a)
pR−i > 2(cDG −σ)−w− t := p′′′′R−i (3.7b)
Because p′′′′R−i is strictly smaller than p′′′R−i for cDG −σ > w the best response can be
given by both the second and the third case of Equation (3.5) between p′′′R−i and p′′′′R−i .
Substituting both cases into the profit function and comparing the resulting profits
yields pˆR−i := (1+
p
3)(cDG−σ)−p3w− t as the boundary condition. Based on the
12The first order conditions are presented in Equation (3.16) in Appendix 3.7.1.
13This case is discussed in detail in Mérel and Sexton (2010).
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described results, the reaction function is reformulated in Equation (3.8).
pRi(pR−i) =

t + pR−i + w
2
if pR−i ≤ p′R−i
2(cDG −σ)− pR−i − t if p′R−i < pR−i ≤ p′′R−i
t + pR−i + 3w+ 2(cDG −σ)
6
if p′′R−i < pR−i ≤ pˆR−i
t + pR−i + w
2
if pR−i > pˆR−i
(3.8)
The four cases of the reaction function correspond to the four cases depicted in Fig-
ure 3.2. In the first case distributed generation is not used. In the second case
distributed generation is at the margin to competitiveness. In the third case some
consumers Cs use distributed generation and in the fourth case all substitutable con-
sumption is supplied with distributed generation.
Solving the reaction functions for the four possible equilibria and determining the
parameter values under which they emerge gives the equilibrium solution of the
retailer problem:
Lemma 3.1. There are four types of symmetric equilibria depending on the relationship
between the subsidized costs of distributed generation cDG −σ, wholesale price w and
the degree of horizontal differentiation t:
pRi =

w+ t if cDG −σ ≥ w+ 32 t
cDG −σ− t2 if w+
7
6
t ≤ cDG −σ < w+ 32 t
2(cDG −σ) + 3w+ t
5
if w+
2
p
3
5+
p
3
t ≤ cDG −σ < w+ 76 t
w+ t if cDG −σ < w+ 2
1+
p
3
t
(3.9)
Proof. See Appendix 3.7.1.
The reaction functions are depicted graphically in Figure 3.3. The decisive model
parameter is the effective cost of distributed generation cDG−σ because it determines
to which extent distributed generation interferes with the strategic interactions of
the two retailers. The reaction function described in Equation (3.8) consists of four
parts of which the intermediate parts are directly affected by changes in cDG − σ.
Both are shifted downwards as cDG −σ decreases which explains the four possible
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Figure 3.3: Reaction functions and different types of equilibria
equilibrium regions described in Lemma 3.1.
If cDG −σ is very large, distributed generation is too expensive to be an alterna-
tive to grid-based electricity for all consumers. Consequently, the standard result of
spatial competition models applies. This case is depicted in Figure 3.3(a).
As cDG −σ decreases, the first consumer is tempted to substitute grid-based elec-
tricity with distributed generation. The equilibrium answer of the retailers is to lower
prices in order to render distributed generation just unattractive for consumers. As
shown in Figure 3.3(b) the reaction functions are downward sloping and overlap
for this type of equilibrium. As a result there exist technically an infinite number
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of asymmetric equilibria. Restricting to symmetric equilibria yields the unique equi-
librium described in Lemma 3.1.14 The reaction functions are downward sloping
because distributed generation is at the margin to competitiveness. If one of the
retailers increases the price in this situation, consumers located in the middle of the
Hotelling line start to use distributed generation. The best response of the corre-
sponding other retailer is then to lower the price in order to gain market share and
reestablish the situation in which distributed generation is just unattractive for the
consumer with the largest preference dependent disutility.
If cDG − σ further decreases, it is no longer worthwhile for the retailers to fully
compensate increased competitiveness of distributed generation with price reduc-
tions. Instead retailers give up on those customers least attracted to one of the two
firms, which are located in the middle of the Hotelling line. Consequently, these con-
sumers start to use distributed generation and avoid grid-based electricity consump-
tion. This equilibrium corresponds to the left intersection of the reaction functions
in Figure 3.3(c).
Finally, if distributed generation is very cheap, retailers give up on all substitutable
electricity consumption. As a result retailers fully disregard consumers Cs and focus
on the non-substitutable share of electricity demand. As indicated by the right inter-
section of the reaction functions in Figure 3.3(c), retailers return to the high equi-
librium price of the first case. As shown in Figure 3.3(c), the reaction functions can
intersect twice, which means that serving consumers Cs and Cns as well as as disre-
garding consumers Cs are equilibrium solutions. From Lemma 3.1 follows that this
can only be the case for w+ 2
p
3
5+
p
3
t ≤ cDG −σ < w+ 21+p3 t. Based on the described
equilibria in the retail market Proposition 3.1 is formulated.
Proposition 3.1. Increasing subsidies for distributed generation can increase the retail
price for grid-based electricity.
Proof. See Appendix 3.7.1.
Figure 3.4 depicts retail prices as a function of the subsidized cost of distributed
generation cDG−σ in order to clarify the intuition of Proposition 3.1. Figure 3.5 de-
picts the corresponding retailer profits.15 Figures 3.4 and 3.5 distinguish five areas,
which are discussed from right to left in the following.
14As pointed out by Mérel and Sexton (2010), the focus on symmetric equilibria is not too restrictive
because introducing even a slight elasticity into consumer demand establishes a unique symmetric
equilibrium. Additionally the range of retail prices in the asymmetric equilibria is relatively small.
15The mathematical expressions of retailer profits are presented in the appendix.
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Figure 3.4: Retail prices in equilibrium
In area I , the retail market is not affected by distributed generation and each
retailer earns a profit of t by charging a mark-up t on wholesale prices, which corre-
sponds to the first case of Equation (3.9). In area I I , retailers adjust retail prices to
keep the market fully covered with grid-based electricity as described in the second
case of Equation (3.9). Profits linearly decrease with cDG −σ because the quantity
of sold electricity remains constant. In area I I I retailers further adjust prices but
consumers in the middle of the Hotelling line start to use distributed generation.
The slope of the price function in the third case is lower because there are price and
quantity adjustments to changes in cDG −σ. The profit function is quadratic for the
same reason.
In area IV there are two possible equilibria which means that the reaction func-
tions intersect in the third and in the fourth case of Equation (3.8). As a result,
price adjustments as in area I I I as well as disregarding consumers Cs in order to
serve only non-substitutable electricity consumption with higher mark-ups yield sta-
ble symmetric equilibria. Retailer profits are strictly larger in the equilibrium where
only consumers Cns are served with grid-based electricity in area IV . Finally in
area V there is again only one symmetric equilibrium, in which retailers discard
consumers Cs and all substitutable electricity consumption is met with distributed
generation.
With respect to the level of subsidization for distributed generation Figure 3.4
shows that an increase in subsidies lowers retail prices as long as both consumer
groups Cns and Cs are served by retailers because distributed generation puts com-
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Figure 3.5: Retailer profits in equilibrium
petitive pressure on retailers. However, if cDG − σ is already sufficiently low, an
increase in subsidization can shift the equilibrium from a situation in which both
consumer groups Cns and Cs are served to an equilibrium in which only consumers
Cns are served by retailers. If this is the case, the increased subsidization increases
retail prices as stated in Proposition 3.1.
3.3.3 Welfare effects
This section assesses the implications of the presented results on welfare. First the
effect on consumer surplus is discussed, followed by a discussion of total welfare
effects.
Consumer surplus
Consumer surplus consists of surplus of consumers Cs and Cns, which differs de-
pending on the retail market outcome. Both surplus functions can be determined by
substituting the results of Lemma 3.1 into the utility functions and integrating over
the consumer taste parameter x . The resulting total consumer surplus function is
presented in Lemma 3.2.
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Lemma 3.2. Consumer surplus in equilibrium is described by the following equation:
CS =

2v − 2w− 5
2
t if cDG −σ ≥ w+ 32 t
2v − 2(cDG −σ) + t2 if w+
7
6
t ≤ cDG −σ < w+ 32 t
2v − 2(cDG −σ) + 9(cDG −σ−w+
t
2)
2
25t
− t
2
if w+
2
p
3
5+
p
3
t ≤ cDG −σ < w+ 76 t
2v −w− (cDG −σ)− 54 t if cDG −σ < w+
2
1+
p
3
t
(3.10)
Proof. See Appendix 3.7.1.
The consumer surplus function consists of four parts, analogously to the four types
of retail market equilibria. The subsidized cost of distributed generation cDG−σ de-
termines the retail market outcome and the subsequent level of consumer surplus.
The main result with respect to the influence of subsidization of distributed genera-
tion on consumer surplus is described in Proposition 3.2.
Proposition 3.2. Increasing subsidies for distributed generation can reduce consumer
surplus even if consumers do not contribute to financing the subsidy payments.
Proof. See Appendix 3.7.1.
To clarify the implications of Proposition 3.2, Figure 3.6 depicts the net effect of
distributed generation on consumer surplus ∆CS as a function of cDG −σ.16 Anal-
ogously to Figure 3.4 five areas are distinguished. In area I the retail market is
unaffected by distributed generation. In area I I , retailers adjust prices in order to
keep the entire market covered with grid-based electricity. As a result, consumer sur-
plus increases as cDG−σ decreases. Both consumer groups benefit from lower prices
for distributed generation because prices are adjusted for all consumers. In area I I I ,
consumers start to use distributed generation. Again, both consumer groups bene-
fit from price adjustments as cDG − σ decreases. Additionally consumer group Cs
avoids costs due to taste mismatch by using distributed generation. Therefore, the
surplus of consumers Cs in area I I I is strictly above surplus of consumers Cns and the
16Formally the net effect of distributed generation on consumer surplus is defined as ∆CS = CS −
(2v − 2w− 52 t).
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consumer surplus function is quadratic. In area IV there exist two equilibria, one
in which both consumer groups Cns and Cs are served and one in which consumers
Cs are disregarded by retailers. In area V , there is again a unique equilibrium in
which only consumers Cns are served by retailers. If only consumers Cns are served
by retailers, consumer surplus increases as cDG −σ decreases because consumers Cs
benefit from lower costs of distributed generation.
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Figure 3.6: Effect of distributed generation on consumer surplus
As shown in Figure 3.6 there is a discontinuity in the consumer surplus function
when consumers Cs are discarded by retailers. This discontinuity results of two
effects. First, consumer group Cns is charged a higher retail price pRi = w+t. Because
of the higher retail price, surplus of consumers Cns is strictly below the surplus of
consumers Cs if consumer group Cs is discarded by retailers. Second, all consumers
Cs are pushed into usage of distributed generation when retailers raise prices to
pRi = w + t. A direct result from these two effects is that an increase in subsidy
payments can decrease consumer surplus if the increased subsidy payments induce
retailers to discard substitutable electricity demand in order to focus on the non-
substitutable share of demand. This holds true even if the subsidy comes at no costs
for consumers, which is assumed in this section.
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Total surplus
Total welfare can be determined as the sum of retailer profits and consumer surplus.
The aggregated welfare effects are described in Lemma 3.3.
Lemma 3.3. Total surplus in equilibrium is described by the following equation:
TS =

2v − 2w− t
2
if cDG −σ > w+ 76 t
2v − 2(cDG −σ) + 84(cDG −σ−w+
t
2)
2
100t
− t
2
if w+
2
p
3
5+
p
3
t ≤ cDG −σ < w+ 76 t
2v −w− (cDG −σ)− t4 if cDG −σ < w+
2
1+
p
3
t
(3.11)
Proof. See Appendix 3.7.1.
Because of the assumed inelastic electricity demand, total welfare changes are
limited to two effects. First, consumers avoid costs due to taste mismatch when
they use distributed generation. Second, distributed generation is more costly than
the wholesale price for electricity. Consequently consumers avoid paying rents to
retailers by using an outside option that would not be competitive without the mark-
ups charged by retailers. Based on the effect of subsidies for distributed generation
on total surplus, Proposition 3.3 is formulated.
Proposition 3.3. Usage of distributed generation increases total surplus if and only if
cDG −σ < w+ 14 t.
Proof. See Appendix 3.7.1.
To illustrate the intuition behind Proposition 3.3, Figure 3.7 depicts the net effect
of distributed generation on total surplus∆TS.17 Again five areas are distinguished
in Figure 3.7. In area I , the retail market is unaffected by distributed generation. In
area I I , retailers adjust prices to keep the market fully covered with grid-based elec-
tricity. However, total surplus remains unchanged because welfare is shifted from
retailers to consumers without a net effect on total surplus. In area I I I distributed
17Formally the net effect of distributed generation on total surplus is defined as ∆TS = TS − (2v −
2w− t2 ).
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generation enters the market and consumers avoid paying rents to retailers by di-
rectly producing electricity. However, distributed generation is still costly compared
to the wholesale price of electricity when it enters the market because of the mark-
up charged by retailers. As a result, the decrease in retailer profits outweighs the
increase in consumer surplus and total surplus decreases as consumers start to adopt
distributed generation.
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Figure 3.7: Effect of distributed generation on total surplus
In area IV further price adjustments as well as discarding consumers Cs are equi-
librium solutions. A switch to an equilibrium, in which consumers Cs are discarded
by retailers always decreases total surplus in area IV because all consumers Cs are
pushed into usage of distributed generation. In area V , only discarding consumers Cs
is an equilibrium solution. For low values of cDG−σ in area V total surplus is higher
compared to a situation without usage of distributed generation. This increase in
total surplus emerges because all consumers Cs use distributed generation and there-
fore avoid costs due to taste mismatch. Consequently, total surplus increases if the
avoided costs due to taste mismatch exceed the difference between the subsidized
costs of distributed generation cDG −σ and the wholesale price w.
3.4 Regulator problem
In the first stage of the model, the regulator decides on the subsidy for distributed
generation. In this section, the optimal regulatory strategy is derived. In contrast
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to the welfare effects discussed in the previous section, the cost of the subsidy pay-
ments are accounted for in the regulator problem. It is assumed that the regulator
maximizes consumer welfare. Hence, a consumer surplus standard is applied in the
model. Applying a consumer surplus standard instead of a total surplus standard in
competition policy is controversial in economic literature. However it seems appro-
priate in the present context for two reasons. First, retail markets for electricity are
still highly concentrated in many countries, which makes reducing market power
of suppliers one of the main regulatory concerns in practice. Second, unbalanced
powers between consumers and producers as a result of information asymmetries
and lobbying activities, which is one of the main arguments in favor of a consumer
surplus standard, seem to be an issue in the electricity industry.18
The regulator maximizes consumer surplus while taking into account the costs of
the subsidy. Subsidy payments are assumed to be refinanced by end consumers on a
per capita basis, which means that consumers can not avoid contributing to subsidy
financing.19 The resulting maximization problem for the regulator is formulated in
Equation (3.12).
max
σ
CS −σ ∗ qD (3.12)
The regulator maximizes the difference between consumer surplus CS and subsidy
payments which are determined by the product of the level of subsidization σ and
the usage of distributed generation qD. The regulator problem is solved by substitut-
ing the consumer surplus function formulated in Lemma 3.2 into Equation (3.12).
An important issue is that the regulator faces the possibility of multiple equilibria
in the retail market, which means that the regulator can not anticipate with certainty
the resulting equilibrium for some levels of subsidization.20 Two different types
of equilibria can emerge, in which retailers either choose to serve both consumer
groups Cs and Cns or choose to discard consumers Cs and serve only consumers
Cns in order to realize higher margins. The second type of equilibrium leads to
strictly lower consumer surplus when multiple equilibria are possible.21 Because
of this relation, it is assumed that the regulator does not risk the realization of the
consumer harming equilibrium. This assumption can be interpreted as risk averse
18For a general discussion of consumer surplus vs total surplus standard, see Motta (2004). A discus-
sion of market concentration in retail markets for electricity in the United States and the European
Union is provided in Morey and Kirsch (2016). Kang (2015) empirically analyzes lobby activity of
the energy and electric utility industry in the United States
19See Section 3.5.1 for a discussion of a setting where consumers can avoid contributing to subsidy
financing by using distributed generation.
20See Lemma 3.2.
21See Figure 3.6.
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behavior of the regulator. Based on the described assumptions the optimal subsidy
policy is summarized in Lemma 3.4.
Lemma 3.4. Depending on the relationship between the cost of distributed generation
and the wholesale price of electricity, the regulator chooses the following subsidies:
(i) For cDG−w> 116 t, the regulator positions distributed generation as a competitor
to grid-based electricity with σ = cDG −w− 76 t. There is no usage of distributed
generation.
(ii) For 116 t ≥ cDG − w ≥ 15+
p
3
5+5
p
3
t, the regulator implements the optimal amount of
distributed generation with σ = 17(2(cDG −w) + t).
(iii) For cDG − w < 15+
p
3
5+5
p
3
t, the regulator avoids additional distributed generation
in order to prevent retailers from charging the full mark-up while discarding
consumers Cs with σ = cDG −w− 21+p3 t.
Proof. See Appendix 3.7.1.
The implications of Lemma 3.4 are best understood with the depiction of the con-
sumer surplus function in Figure 3.6. As discussed in Section 3.3.3, consumers can
benefit from distributed generation even if it is not used because retailers adjust
prices in order keep the market fully covered with grid-based electricity. This can
be exploited by the regulator to reduce market power of retailers and shift welfare
from producers to consumers. Consequently, the regulator subsidizes distributed
generation even if the usage is inefficient in order to position it as a competitor to
grid-based electricity which is described in the first part of Lemma 3.4. This redis-
tribution of welfare is without a cost because no distributed generation is used and
no subsidy payments have to be made. In the second case of Lemma 3.4, distributed
generation is adopted by some consumers. The regulator chooses optimal subsidies
in order to internalize the competitive effect of distributed generation into consumer
decisions.
With increased adoption of distributed generation, retailers discard the substi-
tutable share of electricity demand in order to charge higher mark-ups on the non-
substitutable demand, which leads to a decrease in consumer surplus. In the third
case of Lemma 3.4, the regulator avoids this pricing strategy by setting the sub-
sidy to a level, which ensures that retailers always choose to serve both consumer
groups. Hence, the regulator avoids additional distributed generation in order to
prevent retailers from raising prices. The regulator therefore never chooses a sub-
sidy level that leads to full substitution of demand of consumers Cs with distributed
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generation. This result is independent of the assumed risk averseness of the regu-
lator. Under a different assumption, the regulator would risk the realization of the
equilibrium where consumers Cns are discarded. However the regulator would still
strictly prefer the retail equilibrium in which both consumer groups are served. The
results are summarized in Proposition 3.4.
Proposition 3.4. If the cost of subsidy payments is accounted for, maximal usage of
distributed generation is never welfare optimal for consumers.
Proof. See Appendix 3.7.1.
To give additional intuition for Proposition 3.4, Figure 3.8 shows the solution of
the regulator problem as a function of cDG . The depiction additionally differentiates
between the two consumer groups Cs and Cns. In area I , no distributed generation
is used but the regulator sets subsidies in order to position distributed generation as
a competitor to grid-based electricity which induces positive welfare effects for both
consumer groups. In area I I , distributed generation enters the market. Both con-
sumer groups benefit as retail prices are further reduced. Consumers Cs additionally
avoid costs caused by taste mismatch which leads to a level of surplus strictly above
the surplus of consumers Cns for cDG < w+
11
6 t. In area I I I the amount of distributed
generation used by consumers Cs is constant because the regulator avoids additional
usage in order to protect consumers from higher retail prices. Nevertheless surplus
for both consumer groups further increases with decreasing costs of distributed gen-
eration because the required subsidy payments decrease if distributed generation
becomes more competitive.
3.5 Extensions
This section presents two extensions of the basic model framework. Section 3.5.1
analyzes interactions between distributed generation and grid fees. Section 3.5.2
discusses the impact of the share of electricity demand that can be substituted with
distributed generation.
3.5.1 Distributed generation and grid fees
In practice distributed generation is often subsidized indirectly with exemption rules.
In many countries distributed generation is exempted from grid fee payments. In
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Figure 3.8: Solution of the regulator problem
order to asses this within the presented model framework it is assumed that the
electricity purchased from retailers has to be transported to consumers via a grid
infrastructure, which causes fixed costs f i x c > 0. Grid costs have to be recovered
by charging grid fees. It is assumed that a benevolent grid operator sets grid fees
in order to maximize consumer welfare analogously to the regulator in Section 3.4.
Two model settings are considered. In the first setting, the grid operator sets a two-
part tariff consisting of an avoidable variable component pG and a fixed component
f . This configuration is comparable to a network tariff regime with a volumetric
component charged based on consumption from the grid and a fixed component
charged based on the capacity of the grid connection. In the second setting, the grid
operator can only set an avoidable variable component pG , which corresponds to
volumetric tariff structures in practice.
In the first analyzed model setting consumers can avoid the variable grid fee com-
ponent by using distributed generation, while the fixed component f can not be
avoided. The exemption from grid fee payments is modeled by setting σ = pG .
The resulting problem of the grid operator is formulated in Equations (3.13a) and
(3.13b). Consumer surplus CS is determined by the surplus function presented in
Lemma 3.3 with σ = pG . Additionally, grid fee payments are added to the surplus
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function and the cost recovery constraint in Equation (3.13b) is introduced.
max
pG , f
CS (3.13a)
s.t. pG ∗ (qR1 + qR2) + 2 ∗ f ≥ f i x c (3.13b)
As there are no direct subsidy costs in the case of grid fee exemptions, the objective
function (3.13a) consists only of consumer surplus. The solution of Problem (3.13)
is presented in Lemma 3.5.
Lemma 3.5. Depending on the relationship between the cost of distributed genera-
tion and the wholesale price of electricity the grid operator chooses the following tariff
structures:
(i) For cDG − w > 116 t, the grid operator positions distributed generation as a com-
petitor to grid-based electricity with pG = cDG − w − 76 t. There is no usage of
distributed generation and f = f i x c2 − pG ensures recovery of grid costs.
(ii) For 116 t ≥ cDG −w ≥ 15+
p
3
5+5
p
3
t, the grid operator implements the optimal amount
of distributed generation with:
pG =
1
7
 
2(cDG −w) + t

(3.14a)
f =
f i x c
2
− 6
49t

cDG −w+ t2
2
(3.14b)
(iii) For cDG−w< 15+
p
3
5+5
p
3
t, the grid operator avoids additional distributed generation
in order to prevent retailers from charging the full mark-up while disregarding
consumers Cs. Grid fees are set to pG = cDG −w− 21+p3 t and f = f i x c2 − (qR1 +
qR2)
pG
2 .
Proof. See Appendix 3.7.1.
Lemma 3.5 shows, that the optimal subsidy policy can be implemented with grid
fee exemption rules. However, the optimal strategy can only be realized with a
two-part tariff structure. In that case the grid operator can use the variable grid
fee to incentivize optimal usage of distributed generation and adjust the fixed tariff
accordingly in order to ensure recovery of grid costs. The fixed fee f could even be
negative if the required subsides for distributed generation are large. Because of the
two-part tariff structure it is ensured that all consumers contribute to financing fixed
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grid costs. Consequently, costs are allocated in accordance with the cost causation
principle as distributed generation typically does not change fixed network costs in
the short to medium term, especially if consumers keep a grid connection.22
In practice, grid fees often consist only of volumetric tariffs charged based on the
amount of electrical energy withdrawn from the grid. The main difference in a sys-
tem with volumetric tariffs compared to a two-part tariff structure is that fixed grid
costs have to be recovered with variable grid fees. This causes additional incentives
to use distributed generation if decentralized production is exempted from grid fee
payments because consumers can avoid contributing to fixed cost financing by us-
ing distributed generation. Within the presented model framework this leads to the
following reformulation of Problem (3.13):
max
pG
CS (3.15a)
s.t. pG ∗ (qR1 + qR2)≥ f i x c (3.15b)
In the adjusted grid operator problem, there is only one decision variable pG . A
direct result of this limitation is that the regulator is unable to position distributed
generation as a competitor to grid-based electricity because high variable grid fees
directly reduce consumer surplus and a compensation via the fixed fee is not possi-
ble. Additionally, as distributed generation is adopted and consumers start to avoid
grid fees by using distributed generation, the fixed grid costs have to be burdened
on a smaller consumer base, which incentivizes additional usage of distributed gen-
eration. Because of this effect a stable solution where only a share of substitutable
electricity demand is supplied with distributed generation exists only under strict
conditions. If fixed grid costs are high compared to the other cost components of the
electricity systems a spiral effect is induced and all substitutable demand is met with
distributed generation as soon as it is the cheaper option for the first consumer.23
Consequently, a volumetric grid fee structure leads to inefficient levels of distributed
generation within the presented model. The results are summarized in Proposition
3.5. The detailed solution of Problem (3.15) is presented in Appendix 3.7.1.
Proposition 3.5. Optimal subsidization of distributed generation can be implemented
based on grid fee exemptions only with a two-part tariff structure.
Proof. See Appendix 3.7.1.
22The issue of fixed cost recovery in the electricity system is discussed in detail in Borenstein (2016).
23This effect is sometimes refereed to as the death spiral of public utilities, see Castaneda et al. (2017)
for a discussion.
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3.5.2 The share of substitutable electricity demand
In the basic model α= 1 is assumed. Consequently, the electricity demand that can
be substituted with distributed generation equals the non-substitutable electricity
demand. In reality the substitutable share of demand varies depending on a variety
of factors such as technological constraints, geographical conditions, weather condi-
tions or consumer characteristics. To analyze the impact of the share of substitutable
electricity demand, this section generalizes the presented model by varying param-
eter α, while total electricity demand is kept unchanged. Hence, a share α of total
demand can be substituted with distributed generation while the remaining 2 − α
can be supplied only with grid-based electricity.
The solution of the generalized model follows the same logic as the presented so-
lution of the basic model. The detailed derivation is presented in Appendix 3.7.2.
Interestingly, varying the share of substitutable demand shifts the solution space but
the main implications of the model remain. To illustrate the generalized model re-
sults, Figure 3.9 depicts retail prices, retailer profits, consumer surplus and total
surplus for different shares of substitutable electricity demand. As additional ref-
erences, model results for α = 0, which means that no distributed generation is
available, and for α = 2, which means that that electricity demand can be entirely
supplied with distributed generation, are depicted in Figure 3.9.
Figure 3.9(a) depicts the mark-up charged by retailers. It is evident that the basic
intuition described in Lemma 3.1 and Proposition 3.1 is independent of the value
of α. However, the higher the share of substitutable demand, the more retailers are
willing to reduce the mark-up in order to compete against distributed generation.
The reason is that the remaining demand they can cover if the substitutable share
of demand is discarded, decreases as α increases. The corresponding effects on
retailer profits are depicted in Figure 3.9(b). The decrease in retailer profits is more
pronounced the higher the share of substitutable demand. If only a small share of
demand can be substituted with distributed generation, retailers choose earlier to
supply only the non-substitutable share which stabilizes profits on a higher level.
The described dependency of retailer mark-ups on the level of α also shift the
consumer surplus function as shown in Figure 3.9(c). Again, the basic shape of
the function described in Lemma 3.2 remains. However, the potential gains in con-
sumer surplus are higher, if a large share of demand can be supplied with distributed
generation. Additionally, the drop in consumer surplus when retailers discard the
substitutable share of demand, is smaller for large and small values of α and has a
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Figure 3.9: Retailer mark-up (a), retailer profits (b), consumer surplus (c) and total surplus
(d) for different levels of α
maximum for medium values. The reason for this is that as α increases, a smaller
share of the consumers is affected when retailers raise prices. As α decreases on the
other hand, retailers are less willing to adjust prices to distributed generation and
discard the substitutable share of demand earlier, which leads to a less pronounced
discontinuity.
The discussed effects also transfer to the shape of the total surplus function de-
picted in Figure 3.9(d). It can be seen that total surplus always decreases as con-
sumers start to adopt distributed generation. The reason is that consumers avoid
paying rents to retailers, which those generate by exercising market power. How-
ever, distributed generation is still more costly compared to the wholesale price for
electricity when the first consumers start to use it, which leads to the decrease in
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total surplus. The breakeven point for total surplus is at cDG −σ = w + t4 for most
possible values of α, which is consistent with Proposition 3.3. Only for high values
of α above 1.6, there are potentially positive welfare effects when both consumer
groups are served by retailers which leads to a break-even point at slightly higher
levels of cDG −σ.24
The dependency of consumer surplus on α also shapes the optimal regulatory
strategy for subsidizing distributed generation. Nevertheless, the key properties of
Lemma 3.4 remain. It is always beneficial for consumers if the regulator positions
distributed generation as a competitor to grid-based electricity. However for low
values of α, retailers are more reluctant to reduce prices as a response to the outside
competition because the share of non-substitutable demand is high. Consequently,
the potential gains in consumer surplus due to subsidization of distributed gener-
ation are lower for low values of α.25 For the same reason, retailers discard the
substitutable share of demand at higher levels of cDG −σ. In the basic model it is
never optimal for the regulator to allow usage of distributed generation for all con-
sumers Cs as shown in Proposition 3.4. In the generalized model this result remains
true for a wide range of α. Only for high shares of substitutable electricity demand
full substitution with distributed generation can become welfare optimal for con-
sumers. This result is summarized in Proposition 3.6. The full generalized solution
of the regulator problem is presented in Appendix 3.7.2.
Proposition 3.6. If the subsidy costs are accounted for, full substitution of substitutable
electricity demand with distributed generation can be optimal for consumers if and only
if α¦ 1.7.
Proof. See Appendix 3.7.2.
3.6 Conclusion
This article analyzes the impact of distributed generation technologies on retail mar-
kets for electricity. A spatial competition framework is applied in order to account for
horizontal product differentiation and heterogeneous consumer preferences with re-
gard to electricity retailers. I find that distributed generation puts competitive pres-
sure on retailers and induces lower retail prices. Therefore even consumers who
24The exact value is cDG −σ−w = 0.2679t. The calculation is based on the surplus function provided
in Appendix 3.7.2.
25see Figure 3.9(c).
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do not use distributed generation benefit. Regulators can subsidize distributed gen-
eration in order to exploit this competitive effect and increase consumer surplus.
However, if the cost of distributed generation is low and only a limited share of de-
mand can be substituted with distributed generation, there is point at which retailers
disregard the substitutable share of demand and focus on the non-substitutable con-
sumption in order to realize higher mark-ups. As a result, increased subsidies for
distributed generation can increase retail prices and harm consumers. In the opti-
mal regulatory strategy this behaviour of retailers is therefore prevented by limiting
usage of distributed generation.
The results of the analysis show that subsidies for distributed generation can be
a regulatory tool to increase competition in retail markets for electricity. Hence,
policy makers should design subsidy mechanisms for distributed generation with
awareness for the competitive effects. In addition the analysis shows that grid fee
exemptions, which are widely used in practice, are only suitable to implement the
optimal regulatory strategy if a two-part-tariff structure is in place. Exemption rules
with volumetric grid fees lead to inefficient levels of distributed generation.
The analysis is conducted for distributed generation in electricity markets. How-
ever, the results can be also applied for the heating sector. Consumers can avoid
gas consumption for heating by using alternative heating technologies based on re-
newable energy, for example solar thermal technologies. If gas is delivered to end
consumers via a grid infrastructure, the discussed effects on refinancing of grid costs
also apply for operators of gas grids. In further research the presented theoretical
framework could be extended to more complex representations of retail competition,
for example by integrating switching costs into consumer decisions. Additionally, the
wholesale market could be modeled in more detail by accounting for feedback effects
of distributed generation on wholesale prices. Finally, an empirical evaluation of the
presented propositions would be an important contribution to the understanding of
the economics of distributed generation.
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3.7 Appendix
3.7.1 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3.1.
Based on Equation (3.4) the following first order conditions can be derived:
∂ piRi
∂ pRi
=

pR−i − pRi + w
t
if pR−i − t ≤ pRi ≤ 2(cDG −σ)− pR−i − t
t + pR−i − 6pRi + 3w+ 2(cDG −σ)
2t
if 2(cDG −σ)− pR−i − t ≤ pRi ≤ cDG −σ
pR−i − pRi + w
2t
if pRi > cDG −σ
(3.16)
Setting ∂ piRi∂ pRi = 0 and some reformulation yields Equation (3.5). The four symmetric
equilibria follow from the reformulations of the reaction function discussed in Sec-
tion 3.3.2. Despite the discontinuity and the non-monotonicity of the reaction func-
tion (see Equation (3.8)), existence of symmetric pure strategy equilibria is guaran-
teed because the game is symmetric with a one-dimensional strategy space and all
jumps in the best reply function are upwards (See theorem 2.6 in Vives (2001)). For
the second case of Lemma 3.1, symmetry is assumed.
Proof of Proposition 3.1.
Distributed generation is competitive to grid-based electricity if cDG −σ < w + 32 t.
For w+ 76 t ≤ cDG−σ < w+ 32 t increased subsidies decrease retail prices as ∂ pRi∂ σ = −1.
For w + 2
p
3
5+
p
3
t ≤ cDG −σ < w + 76 t, ∂ pRi∂ σ = −25 . Consequently, increased subsidies
decrease retail prices as long as both consumer groups are served by retailers. If
retailers discard consumers Cs the retail price is w + t, which is strictly larger than
2(cDG−σ)+3w+t
5 for cDG−σ < w+2t. Consequently increased subsidies increase retail
prices if the solution is shifted from an equilibrium where both consumer groups Cs
and Cns are served by retailers and cDG −σ < w + 32 t to a solution where retailers
discard consumers Cs.
Proof of Lemma 3.2.
Consumer surplus is calculated by integrating over the utility function of consumers.
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Consumer surplus for consumers Cns is determined by Equation (3.17).
CSns = 2 ∗
∫ 1
2
0
(v − pRi − t x)d x (3.17)
Consumer surplus for consumers Cs is determined by the sum of surplus resulting
from grid-based electricity and distributed generation, where qRis stands for electric-
ity sold by retailer i to consumers Cs and qD stands for distributed generation:
CSs = 2 ∗
∫ qRis
0
(v − pRi − t x)d x +
∫ qD
0
 
v − (cDG −σ)

d x (3.18)
Substituting the results of Lemma 3.1 into Equations (3.17) and (3.18) and summing
CS = CSns + CSs yields Lemma 3.2 after some reformulation.
Proof of Proposition 3.2.
For cDG −σ < w+ 32 t, consumer surplus is strictly increasing in subsidies as long as
both consumer groups Cs and Cns are served by retailers. For w +
7
6 t ≤ cDG −σ <
w + 32 t,
∂ CS
∂ σ = 2 and for w +
2
p
3
5+
p
3
t ≤ cDG −σ < w + 76 t, ∂ CS∂ σ = 18(−cDG+w+σ)+31t25t ,
which is strictly positive for cDG−σ < w. If retailers discard consumers Cs, consumer
surplus is determined by CS′ = 2v − w− (cDG −σ)− 54 t. If both consumer groups
are served and cDG−σ < w+ 76 t, CS′′ = 2v−2(cDG−σ)+ 9(cDG−σ−w+
t
2 )
2
25t . Because of
CS′ < CS′′ for t > 0, increased subsidies decrease consumer surplus if the solution
is shifted from an equilibrium in which both consumer groups are served, to an
equilibrium in which consumers Cs are discarded by retailers.
Proof of Lemma 3.3.
Total surplus is determined by TS = CS + 2 ∗ piRi . piRi is determined by substitut-
ing the results of Lemma 3.1 into Equation (3.4). The following expression can be
derived:
piRi =

t if cDG −w−σ > 32 t
cDG −w−σ− t2 if
7
6
t ≤ cDG −w−σ ≤ 32 t
6(cDG −w−σ+ t2)2
25t
if w+
2
p
3
5+
p
3
t ≤ cDG −σ < w+ 76 t
t
2
if cDG −σ < w+ 2
1+
p
3
t
(3.19)
With Equation (3.19), the results of Lemma 3.2 and TS = CS + 2 ∗piRi , Lemma 3.3
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follows after some reformulation.
Proof of Proposition 3.3.
If distributed generation is not used, total surplus is determined by TS′ = 2v −
2w − t2 . If only a share of consumers Cs uses distributed generation, total surplus
is determined by TS′′ = 2v − 2(cDG −σ) + 84(cDG−σ−w+
t
2 )
2
100t − t2 . Because TS′′ < TS′
for w + 2
p
3
5+
p
3
t ≤ cDG − σ < w + 76 t, total surplus is strictly smaller in the second
case. If all consumers Cs use distributed generation, total surplus is determined by
TS′′′ = 2v − w − (cDG − σ) − t4 . Because of TS′′′ > TS′ for cDG − σ < w + 14 t,
Proposition 3.3 follows.
Proof of Lemma 3.4.
Equation (3.12) is strictly increasing in σ for cDG −σ ≥ w+ 76 t because qD = 0.
For cDG −σ > w+ 76 t distributed generation is used by consumers. The first order
condition of Equation (3.12) with respect to subsidy σ and CSReg = CS −σ ∗ qD is:
∂ CSReg
∂ σ
=
6(2(cDG −w) + t − 7σ)
25t
(3.20)
Based on
∂ CSReg
∂ σ = 0, σ =
1
7(2(cDG − w) + t) can be derived. The second order
condition
∂ 2CSReg
∂ σ2
= − 4225t is strictly negative for t > 0, which proves a maximum.
The solution is however only valid as long as the optimal subsidy level guarantees
an equilibrium where both consumer groups Cs and Cns are served by retailers. The
threshold value can be determined with Lemma 3.1:
1
7
(2(cDG −w) + t)≤ cDG −w− 2
1+
p
3
t (3.21)
Reformulating Equation (3.21) yields cDG −w≥ 15+
p
3
5+5
p
3
. If this condition is not true,
the optimal subsidy can lead to an equilibrium where retailers discard consumers Cs
and raise prices. The regulator avoids this by setting the subsidy at the boundary
of the fourth case of Lemma 3.1, σ = cDG − w − 21+p3 t. The last step is to check,
if there is a value of cDG − w, where an equilibrium with maximum possible usage
of distributed generation is welfare optimal. This can be verified by substituting the
corresponding solutions for σ into the objective function and comparing the results.
σ = cDG −w− 21+p3 t yields the solution:
CSReg1 = 2v − 2cDG + (6p3− 3)(cDG −w)− (353− 144p3)t (3.22)
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The regulator objective function with maximum distributed generation qD = 1 yields:
CSReg2 = 2v − cDG −w− 54 t (3.23)
Comparing Equation (3.22) with Equation (3.23) yields CSReg1 > CSReg2 for cDG >
0, w > 0, cDG > w and t > 0 which is true by assumption. As a result maximum
usage of distributed generation is never optimal and Lemma 3.4 follows.
Proof of Proposition 3.4.
Proposition 3.4 follows directly from Lemma 3.4.
Proof of Lemma 3.5.
Grid fees are integrated into consumer utility by changing Equations (3.1a) and
(3.1b) to:
Ugrid = v − f − pG − pRi − t |x i − x | (3.24a)
UDG = v − f − pG − (cDG −σ) (3.24b)
Setting σ = pG exempts distributed generation from variable grid fee payments.
The consumer surplus function changes accordingly. Based on Problem (3.13) the
following lagrangian function is derived, with λ as the dual variable of the cost
recovery constraint:
L = CS +λ

2 f − f i x c + pG 3
 
2(cDG − pG −w) + t

5t

(3.25)
∂L
∂ pG
= 0, ∂L∂ f = 0 and ∂L∂ λ = 0 yields:
pG =
1
7
 
2(cDG −w) + t

(3.26a)
f =
f i x c
2
− 6
49t

cDG −w+ t2
2
(3.26b)
λ= 1 (3.26c)
The remainder follows exactly the same logic as the proof of Proposition 3.4 and is
thus omitted.
Proof of Proposition 3.5.
The first part of Proposition 3.5 follows from Problem (3.15) because increased grid
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fees directly reduce consumer surplus if compensation via the fixed component is not
possible. Positioning distributed generation as a competitor to grid-based electricity
for cDG −w+ intc > 116 t is therefore not possible.
For the second part of Proposition 3.5 Problem (3.15) is solved with the lagrangian:
L = CS +λ

− f i x c + pG 3
 
2(cDG − pG −w) + t

5t

(3.27)
∂L
∂ pG
= 0 and ∂L∂ λ = 0 yields:
pG =
1
2
 
cDG −w+ t2
− p3
12
r
−40 f i x c ∗ t + 3 2(cDG −w) + t2 (3.28a)
λ=
3
10

1+
p
3(2(cDG −w) + t)Ç
−40 f i x c ∗ t + 3 2(cDG −w) + t2

(3.28b)
Based on Equations 3.28a and 3.28b it follows that there exists a real solution only
if:
f i x c >
3
 
2(cDG −w) + t
2
40t
(3.29)
Substituting the results into the objective function shows that welfare with volumet-
ric tariffs is strictly lower compared to the two-part tariff case unless:
f i x c =
3
 
2(cDG −w) + t
2
49t
(3.30)
If condition (3.30) is true, the resulting welfare is the same in both cases.
3.7.2 Substitutable share of demand
Varying the share of substitutable electricity demand changes the demand function
from the basic model to:
qRi =

t + pR−i − pRi
t
if pR−i − t ≤ pRi ≤ 2cDG − 2σ− pR−i − t 
2−α t + pR−i − pRi
2t
+α ∗ cDG −σ− pRi
t
if 2cDG − 2σ− pR−i − t ≤ pRi ≤ cDG −σ 
2−α t + pR−i − pRi
2t
if pRi > cDG −σ
(3.31)
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Following the same steps as described in Section 3.3.2, the retailer problem can be
solved to derive the following retail prices:
pRi =

w+ t if cDG −σ−w> 32 t
cDG −σ− t2 if
3
2
t ≥ cDG −σ−w≥ 6+α4+ 2α t
α
 
2(cDG −σ)− t + w

+ 2(t + w)
2+ 3α
if
6+α
4+ 2α
t ≥ cDG −σ−w≥ (2+ 3α)
p
4−α2 − 4+α2
α(6+ 5α)
t
w+ t if cDG −σ−w<
p
4−α2 − 2+α
α
(3.32)
Substituting retail prices into the profit equation yields:
piRi =

t if cDG −w−σ > 32 t
cDG −w−σ− t2 if
3
2
t ≥ cDG −σ−w≥ 6+α4+ 2α t
(2+α)
 
2t + 2α(cDG −σ−w− t2)
2
2(2+ 3α)2 t
if
6+α
4+ 2α
t ≥ cDG −σ−w≥ (2+ 3α)
p
4−α2 − 4+α2
α(6+ 5α)
t
t
2
 
2−α if cDG −σ−w< p4−α2 − 2+α
α
(3.33)
To determine consumer surplus, transport costs for consumers Cs and Cns are normal-
ized to the corresponding total electricity consumption. The resulting expressions
for consumer surplus are:
CSns = 2 ∗
∫ 1
2
0
 
v − pRi − t2−α x

d x (3.34a)
CSs = 2 ∗
∫ qRis
0
 
v − pRi − t
α
x

d x +
∫ qD
0
 
v − (cDG −σ)

d x (3.34b)
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With retail prices from Equation (3.32) and A= (2cDG−2σ−2w−5t), B = (2cDG−
2σ− 2w− t) consumer surplus CS = CSns + CSs can be reformulated to:
CS =

2v − 2w− 5
2
t if cDG −w−σ > 32 t
2v − 2cDG + 2σ+ t2 if
3
2
t ≥ cDG −σ−w≥ 6+α4+ 2α t
2v − 2w+ 1
4(2+ 3α)2 t
 
4α(A2 − 30t2) + 2α2(2A2 − 41t2) +α3B2 − 40t2
if
6+α
4+ 2α
t ≥ cDG −σ−w≥ (2+ 3α)
p
4−α2 − 4+α2
α(6+ 5α)
t
2v − 2w−α cDG −σ−w− 54 t− 52 t if cDG −σ−w<
p
4−α2 − 2+α
α
(3.35)
Summing retailer profits and consumer surplus yields total surplus with B = (2cDG−
2σ− 2w− t), C = (2cDG − 2σ− 2w− 53 t):
TS =

2v − 2w− t
2
if cDG −w− 6+α4+ 2α t
2v − 2w+ 1
4(2+ 3α)2 t
 
4α(B2 − 10t2) + 2α2 6C2 − 35
3
t2

+ 5α3B2 − 8t2
if
6+α
4+ 2α
t ≥ cDG −σ−w≥ (2+ 3α)
p
4−α2 − 4+α2
α(6+ 5α)
t
2v − 2w−α cDG −σ−w− t4− t2 if cDG −σ−w<
p
4−α2 − 2+α
α
(3.36)
Following exactly the same logic as in the proof of Lemma 3.4 the following optimal
regulatory strategy can be determined for α® 1.7:
(i) For cDG −w> 10+α2(2+α) t, σ = cDG −w− 6+α4+2α t.
(ii) For 10+α2(2+α) t ≥ cDG − w ≥ 1α(2+3α)
 
2(α − 2)(2α + 1) + (2 + 5α)p4−α2, σ =
2α(cDG−w)+(2−α)t
2+5α
(iii) For cDG − w < 1α(2+3α)
 
2(α − 2)(2α + 1) + (2 + 5α)p4−α2, σ = cDG − w −p
4−α2−2+α
α
Proof of Proposition 3.6.
If all substitutable electricity demand is supplied with distributed generation, the
following solution for the regulator problem can be derived:
CS −σ ∗ qD = 2v − 2w− 52 t +α(w− cDG +
5
4
t) (3.37)
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Comparing Equation (3.37) with the result of the regulator problem for σ = cDG −
w−
p
4−α2−2+α
α yields that maximum usage of distributed generation can be welfare
optimal for α¦ 1.6985
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4 Optimal Allocation of Variable Renewable
Energy Considering Contributions to Security
of Supply
Electricity markets are increasingly influenced by variable renewable energy such
as wind and solar power with a pronounced weather-induced variability and im-
perfect predictability. As a result, the evaluation of the capacity value of variable
renewable energy, i.e. its contribution to security of supply, gains importance. This
paper develops a new methodology to endogenously determine the capacity value in
large-scale investment and dispatch models for electricity markets. The framework
allows to account for balancing effects due to the spatial distribution of generation
capacities and interconnectors. The practical applicability of the methodology is
shown with an application for wind power in Europe. We find that wind power can
substantially contribute to security of supply in a decarbonized European electric-
ity system in 2050, with regional capacity values ranging from 1 - 40 %. Analyses,
which do not account for the temporal and spatial heterogeneity of the contribution
of wind power to security of supply therefore lead to inefficient levels of dispatch-
able back-up capacity. Applying a fixed wind power capacity value of 5 % results in
an overestimation of firm capacity requirements in Europe by 66 GW in 2050. This
translates to additional firm capacity provision costs of 3.8 bn EUR per year in 2050,
which represents an increase of 7 %.
4.1 Introduction
The Paris climate agreement aims at holding global warming to well below 2 degrees
Celsius (United Nations (2015)), creating the need for a deep decarbonization of the
global electricity sector. Recent cost reductions suggest that the optimal pathway
will to a substantial part be based on variable renewable energy sources (VRE). As
a consequence, global electricity markets are increasingly influenced by generation
technologies based on VRE such as wind and solar energy. Electricity generation
from VRE differs from dispatchable power generation in its pronounced dependency
on weather conditions. These weather-induced variations show spatial variance and
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are not perfectly predictable. Accordingly, there arise important implications for
reliability of supply in power systems as electricity is only storable at comparatively
high cost and the supply-demand balance has to be maintained at all times in order
to prevent outages.
Reliability of supply has always been a major concern in electricity systems as
outages incur high economic losses. With increasing shares of VRE, reliability is-
sues gain further importance due to the variability, spatial dependency and imper-
fect predictability of electricity generation based on VRE and the resulting risk of
unavailability during times of stress (e.g. Cramton et al. (2013)). VRE resources
are typically less correlated on a wider geographical scope, which enables balanc-
ing effects because of imperfectly correlated generation patterns at different loca-
tions. Hence, markets can benefit from these balancing effects via interconnections
and cross-border cooperation. Envisaged reliability levels can thereby be reached
at lower costs compared to reliability measures restricted to national borders (e.g.,
Cepeda et al. (2009) and Hagspiel (2017)). Against this background, the following
research question arises: What is the optimal mix and allocation of VRE capacity
in order to benefit from balancing effects both in generation and contribution to
security of supply to reach an envisaged reliability target?
Assessing the contribution of VRE to security of supply is complex, because of the
stochasticity of electricity generation based on weather-dependent resources. The
ability of an additional VRE generation unit to provide secure capacity depends on
the correlation of its electricity generation with electricity demand and with elec-
tricity generation from other units. To give intuition for this dependency, consider
a simple example for wind energy: An electricity system has an off-peak demand
of one and a peak demand of two with off-peak periods being more frequent com-
pared to peak demand situations. Additionally, there are two possible sites A and
B for investment into wind capacities. Wind generation at site A is perfectly cor-
related with off-peak demand and wind generation at site B is perfectly correlated
with peak demand hours. In this setting, wind capacities at site A generate more
electrical energy because off-peak situations are more frequent. Nevertheless, wind
investments at site B can be preferable because wind generation capacities at site B
generate electricity in the critical peak demand situations. Thus, one unit of wind ca-
pacity at site B reduces the need for one unit of dispatchable capacity and therefore
contributes to security of supply. Now consider the situation where there is already
one unit of wind capacity in place at site B, which generates one unit of electricity
in peak demand hours. The remaining residual demand, which must be supplied by
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dispatchable generation capacity, is one in off-peak and one in peak demand periods.
As a result, installing one additional unit of wind capacity at site B cannot contribute
to security of supply because firm capacity is still required in the off-peak demand
period and thus cannot be substituted. However, if there were wind capacities of
one unit installed at both sites, investing in one additional unit of wind capacity at
site B would indeed contribute to security of supply.
The highly stylized example clarifies that the marginal contribution to security of
supply from additional generation capacities based on VRE depends on all existing
installed capacities within the system, because these capacities and their weather-
dependent generation determine the critical residual demand situations. Typically,
generation patterns of wind and solar power plants at different locations are posi-
tively correlated. Therefore, the ability of one unit of VRE generation capacity to sub-
stitute firm capacity, which is referred to as its capacity value (or capacity credit)1,
declines as the share of VRE in total generation increases.2 Nevertheless, economic
long-term simulation models for electricity markets, which are widely used in scien-
tific and political practice, often assign fixed exogenous capacity values to wind and
solar generation and neglect cross-border effects for reasons of simplification and
computational tractability. Similarly, adequacy studies and capacity mechanisms of-
ten do not or only crudely allow for participation of VRE and are often confined to
national borders.3
Against the described backdrop, this paper develops a new methodology to en-
dogenously determine the contribution of VRE to security of supply in a long-term
partial equilibrium model for electricity markets. The proposed methodology builds
on an iterative approach, which captures the non-linear dependency of the capac-
ity value of VRE on installed capacity and its spatial distribution considering cross-
border cooperation via interconnectors. The methodology therefore determines cost-
minimal investment into power plants taking into account electricity generation as
well as provision of security of supply of VRE, while keeping computational tractabil-
ity in a large-scale application. After introducing our methodology, we apply it in a
1In literature, capacity value and capacity credit are used as synonyms. Throughout this paper we
will stick to the term capacity value. It is important not to confuse a technology’s capacity value
with its capacity factor describing its yearly average capacity utilization.
2See International Renewable Energy Agency (2017) for an overview of empirical studies showing
this decreasing return to scale effect.
3See e.g. Cepeda et al. (2009) and Hobbs and Bothwell (2017) for a discussion. An overview on
how U.S. and European capacity mechanisms credit VRE contributions to reliability is given in
Byers et al. (2018) and European Commission (2016a). Furthermore, there are efforts to coordi-
nate European adequacy assessments and foster cross-border cooperation (European Commission
(2016b)).
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first step to a simple two-country example. Building on that, we extend it to the Eu-
ropean electricity system to determine an optimal decarbonization pathway until the
year 2050, starting from the existing power plant fleet. Our analysis focuses on wind
power, however the presented approach can be applied to all VRE technologies. We
build the analysis on a new dataset, which is based on meteorological reanalysis data
featuring a high spatial and temporal resolution. The data is therefore well suited
to optimally capture the stochastic properties of wind generation and the resulting
contribution to security of supply.
We show that the proposed methodology is capable to endogenously determine
the capacity value of wind power in large-scale investment and dispatch models
for electricity markets. The results of the large-scale application imply that wind
power can substantially contribute to security of supply in a decarbonized European
electricity system cooperating with respect to reliability, with an average wind power
capacity value of 13 % in 2050. Additionally the results show that the capacity value
of wind power is heterogeneous across different regions and years, which is a result
of varying wind conditions as well as increasing total installed capacities and techno-
logical innovation over time. Existing modeling approaches, which typically assign
constant exogenous capacity values for wind power, therefore result in inefficient
levels of dispatchable capacities, which are required to guarantee security of supply
in electricity systems with high shares of VRE. In our application for the European
electricity system, the additional yearly costs for firm capacity provision4 when ap-
plying exogenous fixed wind power capacity values of 5 % compared to endogenous
capacity values amount to 1.5 and 3.8 bn EUR in 2030 and 2050, respectively, which
represents additional costs of 3 % and 7 %. Finally our results suggest that European
market integration can substantially improve the contribution of wind power to se-
curity of supply due to cross-border balancing effects.
Our paper is mainly related to two streams of literature. The first relevant stream
examines system adequacy and reliability of supply in electricity systems. Reliability
of supply in electricity systems has been subject to extensive scientific research effort,
both from a technical as well as an economic point of view.5 In particular, the con-
tribution of individual technologies to system adequacy, i.e. the capacity value, has
been a focus of interest. The probability theory of the capacity value of additional
generation for the cases of statistical independence and dependence is presented in
4The yearly costs to provide firm capacity are calculated by summing the annuitized investment costs
and the fixed operation and maintenance costs of all dispatchable power plants. Thereby, the fixed
costs to hold available dispatchable capacity are represented.
5Early contributions in the two fields include e.g. Billinton (1970) and Telson (1975).
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Zachary and Dent (2012). Based on these theories, various contributions investi-
gate empirical methods to evaluate the capacity value of wind power in electricity
systems.6 Cepeda et al. (2009) investigate the positive implications of connecting
different electricity systems on reliability and ways to internalize cross-border effects
in a two-zone model. Hagspiel et al. (2018) introduce a comprehensive framework
to investigate reliability in power systems consisting of multiple technologies and
interconnected regions. All the mentioned studies focus on static analyses for given
power systems. Consequently, the capacity value is not evaluated within a dynamic
model, which determines the optimal future structure of an electricity system.
The second relevant literature stream focuses on the analysis of electricity sys-
tems with high shares of VRE based on long-term dynamic partial equilibrium mod-
els. Typical research questions within this literature are optimal decarbonization
pathways for electricity systems or optimal allocation of renewable generation ca-
pacites. However, the contribution of VRE to security of supply is often only crudely
accounted for by assigning fixed exogenous capacity values.7 Grave et al. (2012)
address this issue by varying the capacity value of wind power exogenously in order
to determine sensitivities in the resulting amount of required dispatchable back-up
capacity. The endogenous dependency of the capacity value on total installed ca-
pacity of VRE and the impact of interconnections are not accounted for. Welsch
et al. (2015) integrate a stepwise linear function for the capacity value into an op-
timization model. As a result, the capacity value declines endogenously. However,
balancing effects of imperfectly correlated wind power generation in different ge-
ographical areas and technological innovation over time are not captured by this
approach. Hobbs and Bothwell (2017) use a market equilibrium model for the ER-
COT system to endogenously assess the capacity value of wind and solar power.
However, they apply a greenfield approach with a limited regional representation
of wind and solar power generation. The scalability of the applied methodology to
more complex models with various years and a higher geographical resolution is
computationally limited.
In summary, our contribution with respect to the above mentioned literature is
to (i) endogenously evaluate the capacity value of wind power within a dynamic
investment and dispatch model for electricity markets, while (ii) accounting for the
statistical properties of wind power in interconnected systems and (iii) keeping com-
6See e.g. Keane et al. (2011) for a discussion of different methodologies including capacity value
approximation techniques and Milligan et al. (2017) for a recent review of research on the capacity
value of wind power.
7See for example Hagspiel et al. (2014) or Fürsch et al. (2013).
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putational tractability in a large-scale application.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 introduces our
methodology. Section 4.3 illustrates the proposed approach based on a simple ex-
ample with two countries. Section 4.4 discusses a large-scale application for the
European electricity system. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Methodology
In order to develop a consistent economic framework to investigate the system ad-
equacy of future electricity systems and the contribution of VRE generation to reli-
ability, we will start with a brief revision of the reliability metrics, in particular the
well-known loss of load expectation, expected energy unserved and equivalent firm
capacity measures, and a definition of the capacity value (Section 4.2.1). We will
then describe a framework to calculate the contribution of a single supplier to reli-
ability, i.e. its capacity value, based on an optimization framework (Section 4.2.2).
Subsequently, we will revisit the optimization problem for planning and operation of
power systems in order to show how the capacity value of individual technologies is
typically accounted for in long-term investment and dispatch models (Section 4.2.3).
Finally, we will discuss how the two economic modeling frameworks are linked by
means of an iteration procedure developed in this work (Section 4.2.4).
We will use the notation as listed in Table 4.1. Unless noted differently, we will use
capital letters for random variables, bold capital letters for sets, lower case letters
for parameters and bold lower case letters for optimization variables.
4.2.1 Reliability metrics
Different methodologies have been proposed to determine generation adequacy and
the capacity value of individual technologies. Hereby, the two measures loss of
load expectation (LOLE) and expected energy unserved (EEU) are often applied
to depict the ability of a system to cover expected load levels (Allan and Billinton
(1996)). The contribution of individual technologies to system adequacy, i.e. its
capacity value, has been investigated using different approaches, whereof the most
commonly used are the effective load carrying capability (ELCC) and the equiva-
lent firm capacity (EFC) approaches (Keane et al. (2011), Madaeni et al. (2013),
Zachary and Dent (2012)). Following Hagspiel et al. (2018), we apply the EFC
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Table 4.1: Model sets, parameters and variables
Sets
i ∈ I Generation technologies
m, n ∈M Markets
t ∈ T,T Time (T: complete data set, T : time slices)
Random variables
L Load
X Availability of existing capacity
Y Availability of extra capacity
K Availability of import capacity
Parameters
LOLP Loss of load probability
LOLE Loss of load expectation
EEU Expected energy unserved
EFC Equivalent firm capacity
x¯ Nominal capacity of existing generator
x Availability of existing generator
y¯ Nominal capacity of extra generator
v Capacity value of extra capacity y¯
k¯ Transmission capacity
η Transmission efficiency
l Load
lpeak Peak demand
δ Fixed costs
γ Variable costs electricity generation
Optimization variables
z Overall equivalent firm capacity needed
zy Equivalent firm capacity of extra capacity y¯
u Load curtailment
k Capacity / electricity transmission between markets
x¯ Generation capacity
g Electricity generation
approach.8 Note that the EFC approach provides consistent results with the ELCC
approach (Amelin (2009)).
In the following, we will briefly revisit the derivation of the well-known LOLE and
EEU measures. We define the loss of load probability (LOLP) at a specific instant
in time t as
LOLPt = P(X t < Lt), (4.1)
i.e., as the probability that the available existing capacity X t is smaller than load
8Amelin (2009) define the equivalent firm capacity of a generating unit as the capacity of a fictitious
100 % reliable unit, which results in the same loss of load probability decrease as the respective
unit.
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Lt (Allan and Billinton (1996)).
9
The well-known reliability level measure loss of load expectation is then derived
by summing up probabilities over some time-period T :
LOLE =
∑
t∈T
LOLPt . (4.2)
To calculate the expected energy unserved EEU , the LOLPs are weighted with the
expected load level that cannot be served:
EEU =
∑
t∈T
E(Lt − X t) ∗ LOLPt . (4.3)
The contribution of individual technologies is then determined by applying the
EFC approach. Our focus of interest is the amount of equivalent firm capacity zy
by which the available existing capacity X t can be reduced when installing some
new capacity y¯ with availability Yt ∈ [0, 1], such that the initial (target) reliability
level EEU is achieved. Thus, by replacing X t by its equivalent (X t + y¯Yt − zy) and
applying Equation (4.1), the modified equation that needs to be solved for zy then
writes as
EEU =
∑
t∈T
E(Lt − (X t + y¯Yt − zy)) ∗ P(X t + y¯Yt − zy < Lt). (4.4)
Based on the resulting zy , the capacity value v of a technology with capacity y¯
can be calculated according to
v =
zy
y¯
(4.5)
with 0≤ v ≤ 1.
In practice, Equation 4.4 is typically solved by means of numerical iteration: after
y¯ has been added to the system, in each iteration step zy is increased by some small
amount until the reliability target EEU is reached.
The above equations describe a self-contained system without interconnections
to neighboring systems. In interconnected systems, the LOLP and LOLE depend
on the statistical characteristics of the random variables involved, i.e. their joint
distributions. If we consider dependent stochastic variables such as load and wind
9Note that in Equation (4.1), we implicitly assume that load is inelastic with no adjustment when
capacity is scarce, e.g., due to the lack of real-time pricing.
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profiles in neighboring countries, the problem becomes analytically highly complex
and thus not tractable in a large-scale application.10 Thus we apply a framework that
endogenously determines the level of equivalent firm capacity by means of numerical
optimization, as described in the following section.
4.2.2 A framework for endogenous equivalent firm capacity in multiple
interconnected markets
In contrast to the above introduced reliability metrics, which typically build upon ex-
ogenously given existing capacities X t and demand levels Lt , the framework at hand
endogenizes the level of equivalent firm capacity by minimizing the firm capacity z
that needs to be available in the system to achieve the target reliability level EEU .
Following Hagspiel et al. (2018), we formulate the deterministic equivalent of the
probabilistic problem by replacing probabilities and random variables by their de-
terministic counterpart based on data covering a large range of possible outcomes,
which is typically referred to as hindcast approach in the literature. Hereby, the
probability measure P models the distributions of the random variables, approxi-
mated via sums over historic time series. The validity of the hindcast approach may
be justified by the central limit theorem (Zachary and Dent (2012)).
The general idea of the optimization framework is the following: A central author-
ity (social planner) minimizes the required firm capacity over all markets to reach
a certain market-specific target reliability level EEU , taking into consideration load,
solar and wind characteristics as well as interconnection constraints.11 Alternatively,
the social planner problem can be interpreted as a representation of multiple inter-
connected markets, which perfectly cooperate with respect to reliability. The result-
ing planning problem can then be formulated as the integrated optimization problem
(4.6).12
The objective function (4.6a) minimizes the sum of firm capacity zm over all mar-
kets, subject to four constraints: The adequacy constraint (4.6b) states that the
10See Zachary and Dent (2012) for a thorough discussion of the probability theory of the capacity
value of additional generation considering independent and dependent variables.
11It is straightforward to reformulate the problem for reliability targets based on the LOLE measure
instead of EEU (see Hagspiel et al. (2018)). Note however, that, as this approach includes binary
load shedding variables, the problem becomes a mixed integer optimization problem as opposed
to the linear program optimization at hand.
12The reader is referred to Hagspiel et al. (2018) for a comprehensive derivation of the methodology.
Note that for notational simplicity, the capacity additions y¯ in Equation (4.4) were dropped and
all capacities exogenously given to the system were aggregated by their nominal capacities x¯ i and
their capacity availabilities x i,t .
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required firm capacity has to be greater or equal to the market-specific and time-
varying load lm,t minus the load curtailment variable um,t , minus the sum of the
available generation capacity, plus the sum over electricity exchanges km,n,t and
kn,m,t between market m and market n at every instant of time t. Thereby, we charge
electricity imports with an efficiency loss ηm,n in order to account for transmission
losses. The reliability constraint (4.6c) requires the sum of load curtailment activities
ut not to exceed a certain reliability target, specified as expected energy unserved
EEU within the considered period of time T . Hence, the load curtailment variable ut
allows for a relaxation of the load serving requirement (Equation (4.6b)) by shaving
off load peaks until the reliability level EEU is reached. And finally, the electricity
exchange constraint (4.6d) limits km,n,t to the installed transmission capacity k¯m,n.
min
∑
m
zm (4.6a)
s.t. zm ≥ lm,t − um,t −
∑
i∈I
x¯ i,m x i,m,t
+
∑
n∈M
km,n,t −
∑
n∈M
ηm,nkn,m,t ∀m, t, m 6= n (4.6b)∑
t
um,t ≤ EEUm ∀m (4.6c)
km,n,t ≤ k¯m,n ∀m, n, t, m 6= n (4.6d)
for i ∈ I, m, n ∈M, t ∈ T.
Solving Problem (4.6) yields the required firm capacity in each market z+m to reach
the specified level of reliability, assuming cooperation with respect to reliability. In
order to determine the capacity value of technology i in market n under perfect
cooperation, we set the corresponding capacity x¯ i,n to zero and resolve the model,
which yields z−i,n,m.
Based on the result we then calculate the technology- and region-specific capacity
value under perfect cooperation according to
vi,n,m =
z−i,n,m − z+m
x¯ i,n
∀i, m, n. (4.7)
This framework can be applied to derive the local capacity value vi,m,m of technol-
ogy i with capacity x¯ i,m with respect to market m where the technology is located
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(n = m), but also to derive the cross-border capacity value vi,n,m of a technology x¯ i,n
located in market n with respect to a neighboring market m.
Note that in this formulation, the capacity value represents the marginal contribu-
tion of a technology to reliability, given the contribution of all other technologies. Or,
framed as a coalition game, it depicts the marginal contribution of a single coalition
member to the total coalition of suppliers, e.g. wind and solar generators.13 Addi-
tionally, note that each market m can consist of more than one region for solar and
wind generation to account for their spatial heterogeneity. Thereby, we implicitly
assume no internal network constraints inside a market.14
4.2.3 Accounting for the contribution to reliability in an investment
and dispatch model
To pursue our objective of investigating allocational effects of different ways to ac-
count for contributions to reliability, we apply an investment and dispatch model
based on optimization problem (4.8). The problem at hand is similar to the in-
tegrated problem for investment and operation as formulated e.g. in Turvey and
Anderson (1977). By assuming inelastic demand, e.g. due to the lack of real-time
pricing, and market clearing under perfect competition - which is common in elec-
tricity market modeling literature - we are able to treat the problem as a cost mini-
mization problem. It can be interpreted as a social planner problem where a social
planner with perfect foresight minimizes total system costs for investment in gener-
13Such a coalition game, namely the allocation of the joint contribution of a set of multiple interdepen-
dent suppliers to reliability has been analysed by Hagspiel (2018). He finds that the Shapley value
represents a unique additive consistent allocation rule. While the Shapley value represents the av-
erage marginal contribution of a single supplier over all possible permutations to form a coalition,
our approach captures the marginal contribution of the analyzed supplier to the full coalition (see
Equation (4.7)). Because of the decreasing returns to scale of the capacity value with respect to
total installed capacity, our approach can be interpreted as a conservative estimate in comparison
to the Shapley value.
14Our approach generally allows for consideration of internal network constraints. It could be ex-
tended in this direction, e.g. by applying a load flow approach with multiple nodes per market.
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ation capacity and the operation of generation and transmission between markets.
min T C =
∑
i,m
δi,mx¯i,m +
∑
i,m,t
γi,m,tgi,m,t (4.8a)
s.t. lm,t =
∑
i
gi,m,t +
∑
n
kn,m,t ∀m, t, m 6= n (4.8b)
gi,m,t ≤ x i,m,t x¯i,m ∀i, m, t (4.8c)
|km,n,t | ≤ k¯m,n ∀m, n, t, m 6= n (4.8d)
km,n,t = −kn,m,t ∀m, n, t, m 6= n (4.8e)
lm,peak ≤
∑
i,n
vi,n,mx¯i,n ∀m (4.8f)
for i ∈ I, m, n ∈M, t ∈ T .
The objective function (4.8a) minimizes total system costs over all markets m,
technologies i and time steps t. It consists of a fixed costs term and a variable costs
term. Generation capacity x¯, electricity generation g and transmission between mar-
kets k are optimization variables. Additional generation capacities can be installed
at the costs of δi,m and electricity generation incurs variable costs of γi,m,t . The cost
minimizing objective function is subject to various constraints: The equilibrium con-
straint (4.8b) states that the load level lm,t has to be satisfied at all times by the sum
of generation in market m and electricity exchanges between markets m and n. Con-
straints (4.8c) and (4.8d) mirror that generation and transmission are restricted by
installed generation and transmission capacities.15 Furthermore, electricity trades
from market m to market n are necessarily equal to negative trades from market n
to market m (Equation (4.8e)). Finally, the peak capacity constraint (4.8f) requires
the sum of generation capacities x¯i,n weighted with their capacity values vi,n,m to be
greater or equal than the market-specific annual peak load lm,peak. Note that both lo-
cal capacity (n = m) as well as capacity from a neighboring market n can contribute
to the peak constraint in market m. The peak constraint is typically introduced in
models that apply a time slices approach in order to represent the full variability of
demand and VRE supply, as well as unavailabilities of dispatchable generation.
The investment and dispatch model (4.8) is formulated as a linear program. How-
ever, as discussed above, the capacity value vi,n,m is a function of generation capacity
15Note that in this formulation, we neglect a market’s internal transmission constraints. Like in the
capacity value framework introduced above, the model at hand could be extended to account for
internal transmission constraints, e.g. by applying a load flow approach with multiple nodes per
market.
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x¯ . Hence, if the capacity value in the peak capacity constraint (4.8f) would be for-
mulated as a function of generation capacity x¯i,m, e.g. by applying the analytical
expression introduced by Voorspools and D’haeseleer (2006) for the capacity value
of wind, the problem would become non-linear. While solution algorithms exist to
solve non-linear problems, the applicability of non-linear problems in real-world,
large-scale electricity market applications often suffers from prohibitively high solv-
ing times. Alternatively, piece-wise linearization would represent a way to deal with
non-linear analytical expressions in linear problems. However, analytical expres-
sions so far only exist for systems without interconnections and are thus not suited
to address our research question. Against this background, we solve the non-linear
problem by means of iteration, as discussed in the following section.
4.2.4 A framework to endogenize the capacity value in a large-scale
electricity market model
In order to endogenize the capacity value of VRE in a large-scale electricity market
model, we introduce the iteration algorithm depicted in Figure 4.1 and discuss its ap-
plication for the example of wind power: after running the investment and dispatch
model (4.8) with exogenous start values for the region-specific capacity values of
wind generation, the capacity value framework (4.6) is applied based on the result-
ing optimal region-specific wind generation capacities. In the next iteration step, the
updated capacity values vi,n,m calculated in Equation (4.7) are passed to the peak
capacity constraint (4.8f) of the investment and dispatch problem. Subsequently,
updated capacity values are calculated considering the new wind capacities. This
iteration algorithm is continued until convergence is reached.
Note that the investment model is solved based on a dataset with reduced temporal
resolution (time slices) in order to keep the model computationally tractable. We
apply a two-stage spatial and temporal clustering algorithm in order to derive a
reduced dataset, which captures the relevant properties of wind and solar generation
as well as load.16 The capacity value on the other hand is calculated based on the full
temporal resolution in order to allow for a correct evaluation of security of supply.
The procedure depicted in Figure 4.1 successively linearizes the non-linear prop-
erties of the capacity value by iteratively solving two corresponding linear problems.
Hence, this novel framework allows to endogenously account for the non-linear de-
16See Section 4.4.2 and Appendix 4.6.2 for a description of the comprehensive high-resolution data
set and the clustering algorithm.
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Investment and
Dispatch Model
Capacity value
framework
Capacities
Complete timeseries
(wind, solar, load)
Time slices
Clustering 
(spatial & temporal)
Capacity
value
Figure 4.1: Iteration algorithm
pendency of the capacity value of wind power on the amount and spatial distribution
of installed wind capacity, as well as resulting system effects via interconnectors.
Building on that, effects on system costs and optimal allocation of capacities result-
ing from different ways of crediting the contribution of wind power to reliability can
be quantified. Despite the iterative linearization, the non-linearity of the problem
remains. As a result, existence and uniqueness of a global optimum can not gener-
ally be guaranteed.17 In order to address this issue, we numerically test optimality
by comparing model runs for a wide range of start values.18
From a practical perspective, the social planner in the capacity value framework
can be interpreted as a central authority, e.g. the European Commission, which as-
sesses the required firm capacity in each market in order to reach market-specific tar-
get reliability levels, taking into consideration load, solar and wind characteristics as
well as interconnection constraints. This centralized assessment of market-specific
required dispatchable capacity is then taken as a basis for the amount of capacity
procurement in each market. Consequently, the capacity value framework deter-
mines the required quantity of dispatchable generation capacity, while the specific
cost-minimal structure of back-up capacities to meet this requirement is determined
in the investment and dispatch model.
In the following, we apply the presented methodology to a simple two-country
system for illustrative purposes (Section 4.3), followed by a large-scale application
covering the European electricity system (Section 4.4).
17Global unique optima can be guaranteed for convex minimization problems. A formal proof of the
convexity of the problem is out of the scope of the paper. Nevertheless the decreasing returns to
scale of the capacity value with respect to installed capacity, which is observed in empirical studies,
suggest convexity.
18See Sections 4.3 and 4.4.
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4.3 Illustrative example: Two-country system
In order to illustrate the basic functioning of the proposed methodology, this section
presents an application to a simple case with only two countries, namely France
and Germany. The example follows a greenfield approach, which optimizes the
system configuration in both countries for the year 2030. For reasons of simplifi-
cation, only investments into gas-fired power plants, battery storage and onshore
wind power capacities are allowed with each country consisting of only one wind
region. The interconnection between both countries is assumed to have a capacity of
5 GW. The remaining data assumptions for example on costs, electricity demand and
CO2 reduction targets are equivalent to the large-scale application and are described
in detail in Section 4.4.2.
By solving the integrated problem (4.6), it is assumed that the two countries per-
fectly cooperate with respect to reliability. As such, they take full advantage of bal-
ancing effects in capacity supply and demand. In this illustrative example, for sim-
plification, the reliability target expected energy unserved is set to perfect reliability
(EEU = 0) in both countries, which means that load must be fully served in all
hours as no peak shaving is allowed. Thus, the problem reduces to the analysis of
the hour with peak residual load in each country and derives the minimally required
firm capacity, considering capacity exchanges via the interconnector. The resulting
firm capacity requirement is then applied as minimal capacity procurement level in
the electricity market investment and dispatch model (4.8).
We start the iteration by running the investment and dispatch model with a start
value of 5 % for the local capacity value of wind power and 0 % for cross-border
contributions of wind to security of supply. The resulting capacity values, installed
capacities for wind power and required firm capacity as well as total system costs
are depicted in Figure 4.2 for the first eight steps of the iteration. Figure 4.2(a)
shows the local capacity value of wind power (e.g. ‘FR in FR’ for the capacity value
of French wind power in France) as well as the cross-border capacity value via the
interconnector from France to Germany (‘FR in DE’) and vice versa. In the first itera-
tion step, the electricity market model determines the optimal wind power capacities
based on the start values for the wind power capacity values. The resulting wind
power capacities are then used in the capacity value framework to calculate capac-
ity values based on actual wind infeed and load time series. As shown in Figure
4.2(a), the local capacity value of wind in Germany increases in the second iteration
step, while the French capacity value slightly decreases. Moreover, the cross-border
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capacity values both increase to non-zero values.
(a) Capacity value of wind power in FR and DE (na-
tional and cross-border)
(b) Installed wind power capacity in FR and DE
(c) Required firm capacity in FR and DE (d) Total system costs for two-country system
Figure 4.2: Iteration results for the illustrative two-country system FR-DE
Based on the updated capacity values the electricity market model determines
new optimal wind power investment, taking into consideration the adjusted contri-
bution to security of supply from wind power. As shown in Figure 4.2(b), optimal
wind power capacities increase in the second iteration step because of the higher
capacity value. The corresponding required firm capacity to reach the reliability tar-
get decreases, as shown in Figure 4.2(c). Consequently, the required firm capacity
provided by dispatchable capacities is reduced as the contribution of wind power to
security of supply is increased. In the third iteration, the capacity values are slightly
reduced because increased wind capacities decrease the relative contribution to se-
curity of supply. After the fifth iteration, convergence is reached and the model
results remain constant in the following iterations.19
The two country case shows the basic interactions of the key model variables
throughout the iteration process. In the following section, the methodology will
19In order to test for robustness, the calculations were conducted for a wide range of start values.
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be applied to a real-world large-scale application. The basic logic of the model in-
teractions is identical to the discussion in this section.
4.4 Large-scale application: European electricity market
This section presents an application and extension of the previously developed method-
ology to the European electricity system. A large-scale investment and dispatch
model for the European electricity market is applied in order to determine the op-
timal pathway to a low-carbon electricity system in 2050. Based on the presented
methodology, the development of regional capacity values of wind power over time
and the corresponding implications on optimal allocation of wind power capacities
are assessed.
The analysis is structured as follows: Sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 give a brief descrip-
tion of the applied electricity market model as well as assumptions and data sources.
Section 4.4.3 presents the model results.
4.4.1 Electricity market model and scenario definition
The applied model is a partial equilibrium model that determines the cost minimal
configuration of the European electricity system, considering investment decisions
as well as dispatch of power plants. Cost minimization over several years reflects
perfect competition and the absence of market distortions as well as perfect foresight
as fundamental model assumptions. The model is an extended version of the linear
large-scale investment and dispatch model presented in Richter (2011), which has
been applied for example in Bertsch et al. (2016) and Knaut et al. (2016). The ba-
sic model structure follows the same logic as in Problem (4.8), however additional
constraints are included in order to improve the representation of politically im-
plied restrictions and technical properties of electricity systems. These constraints
include for example ramping or storage constraints as well as politically imposed
CO2 reduction targets to decarbonize the power sector.
20
The model represents a total of 27 European countries.21 Transmission between
20See Richter (2011) for a detailed description of the model.
21Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Bulgaria (BG), Switzerland (CH), Czech Republic (CZ), Germany (DE),
Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE), Spain (ES), Finland (FI), France (FR), Great Britain (GB), Greece
(GR), Croatia (HR), Hungary (HU), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Lithuania (LT), Latvia (LV), Nether-
lands (NL), Norway (NO), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Romania (RO), Sweden (SE), Slovenia (SI),
Slovakia (SK)
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countries is represented by net transfer capacities (NTC), which are assumed to
be extended according to the ENTSO-E Ten-Year Network Development Plan 2018
(ENTSO-E (2018)). The starting year of the model is 2015. Existing capacities in
2015 are based on a detailed database developed at the Institute of Energy Eco-
nomics at the University of Cologne, which is mainly based on the Platts WEPP
Database (Platts (2016)) and constantly updated. Based on these start values, the
model optimizes the electricity system until the year 2050. The European CO2 reduction
targets are implemented as yearly CO2 quotas, which impose a reduction of emis-
sions by 95 % in 2050 compared to 1990 levels. Additional reduction targets for
the intermediate years are implemented with 21 % reduction in 2020 compared to
2005 and 43 % in 2030 compared to 2005. All values are based on official reduc-
tion targets formulated by the European Commission.22 Investment into nuclear
power is only allowed for countries with no existing nuclear phase-out policies. Fuel
costs and investment costs for new generation capacities are based on the World En-
ergy Outlook 2017 (International Energy Agency (2017)). Yearly national electricity
consumption is assumed to develop according to the ENTSO-E Ten-Year Network De-
velopment Plan 2018 (ENTSO-E (2018)). The detailed numerical assumptions are
presented in Appendix 4.6.3.
The country-specific reliability target in the capacity value framework of the large-
scale application is set to an EEU , which corresponds to a loss of load expectation
of 3 hours per year in every modeled country. This value is often applied in theory
(e.g., Keane et al. (2011)) as well as in practice (e.g., in the capacity markets in
Great Britain or by the ISO New England).23
4.4.2 Input data for variable renewable electricity generation and load
In addition to the assumptions described in the previous section, detailed data on
weather-dependent renewable energy sources are required in order to assess con-
tributions to security of supply of wind power generation and to generate robust
estimates for the capacity value. We apply a novel dataset for wind and solar power
22See https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/strategies for detailed explanations.
23In European countries, reliability targets measured in LOLE generally range from 3 to 8 hours per
year (Table 6 in European Commission (2016a)). Note that in case of a loss of load event, the system
operator typically still has a number of options before finally resorting to selective disconnections,
amongst others asking generators to exceed their rated capacity, invoking demand side balancing
reserves or reducing voltage levels (Newbery (2016)). We estimate the EEU corresponding to
LOLE = 3 in each country based on the historical ordered residual load curve in each modeled
country. The resulting EEU for all markets are listed as shares of yearly demand in Table 4.4 in
Appendix 4.6.3.
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generation based on the meteorological weather model COSMO-REA6. The data for
wind power generation from existing capacities is based on Henckes et al. (2018b).
The wind speed data derived from the weather model is combined with a detailed
dataset of European wind parks, which includes location, installed capacity, hub-
height and turbine data in order to generate a consistent hourly time series of wind
power generation over 20 years (1995-2014).
The same methodology is extended in our application for potential future gen-
eration capacities. We assume power curves based on state-of-the-art onshore and
offshore wind power plants for new capacity investment.24 These plants are assumed
to be distributed on a 24x24 km grid over whole Europe in order to determine wind
generation data for potential new generation investment. Again, a consistent hourly
20 year time series of wind power generation is generated.
Even though solar power generation is not the focus of the present analysis we
also use high resolution hourly time series for solar power. The data is generated
based on solar irradiance data of COSMO-REA6 for the same 24x24 km grid over
Europe as for wind power generation. The methodology is described in detail in
Frank et al. (2018) and Henckes et al. (2018a).
In order to keep the large-scale investment and dispatch model computationally
tractable, the spatial and temporal resolution of wind and solar power generation
data has to be reduced. We apply a two-step clustering approach in order to ac-
complish this. In a first step the spatial resolution is reduced by clustering the high
resolution data into representative wind and solar regions. The number of regions
for onshore wind and solar is chosen based on the surface area of each country. Ad-
ditionally one offshore wind region with water depths smaller than 50 m for bottom-
fixed offshore wind turbines and one region with water depths between 50 m and
150 m for floating offshore wind turbines are considered. In total the model consists
of 54 representative regions both for onshore wind and solar power and 41 repre-
sentative regions for offshore wind in Europe (see Table 4.6 in Appendix 4.6.3). A
detailed description of the spatial clustering methodology is presented in Appendix
4.6.2.
Based on the spatially reduced data a temporal clustering is performed in order
to identify time slices, which allow to reduce the temporal resolution without losing
the statistical properties of weather-dependent wind and solar power generation and
24The considered wind turbines are Enercon E-126 EP4 for onshore wind and Vestas V164 for offshore
wind. Power curves for both turbines were determined based on technical data on the manufacturer
websites.
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load. Load data is based on hourly national vertical load25 data for all considered
countries for the years 2011-2015 taken from ENTSO-E (2016). Note that these
historical measurements - being the result of a functioning electricity market - may
include some price responsiveness of consumers or load shedding. However, his-
torical load represents the best approximation available for the variable electricity
demand over time. Additionally, price responsiveness during times of scarcity is low
(Lijesen (2007)), which justifies the assumption of inelastic load. The historical load
data is normalized and scaled based on the assumptions for total yearly future elec-
tricity demand development in order to generate consistent time series.26 Each of
the five years is then combined with the 20 years of renewable energy generation
data in order to get a good representation of the joint probability space, resulting in
100 synthetic years of hourly load and renewable energy data. Hereby, we assume
stochastic independence between load and wind.
Based on this dataset and the temporal clustering approach presented in Nahm-
macher et al. (2016), we generate 16 typical days for the time slices used in the
investment and dispatch model.27 As depicted in Figure 4.1, these typical days are
used as input data only for the electricity market model while the capacity value
calculations are based on the full temporal resolution of the data set.
4.4.3 Results and discussion
This section presents the model results, which are determined based on the de-
scribed methodology and assumptions in an application for wind power. Section
4.4.3 presents the resulting contribution of wind power to security of supply. Based
on these results Section 4.4.3 discusses differences between the proposed optimiza-
tion methodology and existing modeling approaches, which do not account for the
endogeneity of the capacity value of wind power generation.
The applied iteration algorithm converges also in the large-scale application af-
ter only a few iterations (see Figure 4.8 in Appendix 4.6.1). In order to check the
presented results for robustness we ran the model with a wide range of start values
for the capacity value. All robustness checks showed quick convergence and merely
identical results.
25i.e., national net electricity consumption plus network losses.
26Scaling historical load time series implies that the temporal structure of electricity demand does
not change in the future. Consequently, possible changes in the demand structure as a result of
increasing electrification in the mobility or heating sector are not accounted for.
27Nahmmacher et al. (2016) show that, in investment models for electricity markets, even less than
10 typical days are sufficient to obtain similar results to model runs with high temporal resolution.
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Contribution of wind power to security of supply
The main novelty of the presented methodology is the explicit endogenous repre-
sentation of the contribution of wind power generation to security of supply in a
large-scale model for electricity markets. Figure 4.3 shows the resulting aggregated
average national capacity value of European wind power plants together with total
installed wind power capacity in Europe for the simulated years. The presented val-
ues can be interpreted as the average share of wind power capacity in Europe that
can be considered as firm capacity in the respective year, assuming cooperation with
respect to reliability by means of an efficient usage of interconnectors.
(a) Aggregated average capacity value of wind
power in Europe
(b) Aggregated installed wind capacity in Europe
Figure 4.3: Average contribution of wind power to security of supply in Europe
The depicted results show that the contribution of wind power to security of supply
is above 10 % in all considered model years. In 2015 the capacity value of wind
amounts to roughly 14 % on average. Until 2020 this value only slightly decreases
despite capacity additions. The reason is that interconnections between European
countries are extended according to the Ten-Year Network Development Plan 2018
of ENTSO-E. As a result the decline in average capacity value, which results from
additional generation capacities and decreasing returns to scale, is dampened by
additional interconnectors. This dampening effect emerges because we calculate
the capacity value based on the ability of wind power to provide secure capacity
given the availability of interconnections to neighboring countries. Consequently,
as interconnector capacities increase, the ability of wind power to provide secure
capacity in combination with interconnectors also increases.
Remarkably, between 2020 and 2030 the average capacity value of European wind
power increases despite continued capacity additions. This effect can be explained
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by technological innovation as a large share of the existing wind power plants reach
the end of their technical lifetime during this time span. Consequently, many old
wind power plants with relatively low rated capacities and hub heights are substi-
tuted by state-of-the-art wind turbines, which enable more stable and reliable wind
power generation on average. As a result the capacity value increasing effect of
technological innovation in combination with continued increased market integra-
tion outweighs the decreasing effect of decreasing returns to scale. After 2030, the
two increasing effects are less pronounced because the wind power plant fleet is
already to a large part renewed and the extension of interconnectors is less pro-
nounced. Additionally total installed wind power capacity more than doubles from
roughly 230 GW in 2030 to over 560 GW in 2050. Accordingly, the average capacity
value of wind power decreases between 2030 and 2050.
In addition to the described average effects in Europe, the model results show a
strong heterogeneity across different regions. To illustrate this, Figure 4.4 shows
the regional capacity value in 2030 and 2050, based on color-coded maps. It is
shown that the capacity credit varies between 1 % and 40 % across countries and
declines in most regions between 2030 and 2050. Interestingly this is not the case
for all regions, for example in some regions in France and Italy as well as some
offshore regions in France and Norway, the capacity value remains constant or even
increases. In all mentioned regions, this can be explained by small installed wind
power capacities in 2030 and no or relatively small capacity additions between 2030
and 2050. Thus, no decreasing return to scale effect arises, which would reduce
the capacity value. At the same time, the temporal structure of residual load in
neighboring regions changes due to wind and solar capacity additions, increasing the
value of the temporal wind structure in the mentioned regions. It can be concluded
that the differing temporal patterns of wind power generation as well as the differing
total installed capacities, technology mixes and interconnection capacities lead to
heterogeneous contributions of wind power to security of supply across countries.
Based on the market-specific capacity values the equivalent firm capacity of wind
power can be calculated. The results for all considered countries in 2050 are shown
in Figure 4.5. It differentiates between firm capacity that is provided by wind power
plants within the respective country and firm capacity that is provided cross-border
via interconnections to neighboring markets, given they cooperate with respect to
reliability. Again it is apparent that the contribution of wind power to security of
supply varies substantially between countries depending on the capacity value and
the installed capacities. In comparatively large countries such as Germany, France or
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(a) Capacity value of wind power in 2030 (b) Capacity value of wind power in 2050
Figure 4.4: Regional capacity values of wind power in the European electricity system
Great Britain the national equivalent firm capacity of wind power amounts to more
than 10 GW. Additionally, it is shown that substantial cross-border contributions are
present in many countries. In Switzerland, for example, the equivalent firm capacity
provided by wind in neighboring countries amounts to more than 5 GW. This is a re-
sult of increasing Swiss market integration and large installed wind power capacities
in neighboring countries, especially Germany and France.
Implications on electricity system configuration
As shown in the previous section, the contribution of wind power capacities to secu-
rity of supply can be substantial. Additionally the results show that the capacity value
of wind power is heterogeneous across countries and varies over time depending on
the installed capacity of wind power, the available transmission capacities between
countries and technological innovations. In practice however, long-term scenarios
of the electricity system are typically based on the assumption of a fixed exogenous
capacity value (e.g. 5 % in Jägemann et al. (2013)). Because of these modeling
practices we analyze in this section how the results of our proposed methodology
differ from existing modeling approaches with fixed capacity values for wind power.
We thereby compare our model results to equivalent model runs with fixed capacity
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Figure 4.5: National and cross-border equivalent firm capacity provision of wind power in
European countries in 2050
values for wind ranging from 0 % to 20 %.
Figure 4.6 shows the difference in firm capacity requirements for European coun-
tries in 2050 for simulations based on exogenous wind power capacity values com-
pared to simulations applying endogenous capacity values, which account for their
temporal and spatial heterogeneity. Positive values imply additional firm capacity
requirements with exogenous capacity values. It is evident that fixed exogenous
wind capacity values result in inefficient amounts of firm capacity provision. Ap-
plying wind capacity values below 10 % leads to an overestimation of firm capacity
requirements for most countries. In addition, the heterogeneity of the capacity value
across different countries implies that country- or even region-specific evaluations
of the capacity value are necessary in order to correctly estimate the required dis-
patchable firm capacity.
Figure 4.6: Difference in firm capacity requirements in 2050: Endogenous wind power ca-
pacity values vs. exogenous capacity values
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The requirement for additional firm capacity translates into additional yearly costs
for its provision, i.e. annuitized investment costs as well as fixed operation and main-
tenance costs. Typically, such additional dispatchable back-up capacity is provided
by low-cost open-cycle gas turbines. The additional yearly costs for firm capacity
provision when applying exogenous fixed wind power capacity values of 5 % com-
pared to endogenous capacity values amount to 1.5 and 3.8 bn EUR in 2030 and
2050, respectively, which represents additional costs of 3 % and 7 %.
In addition to cost differences the results of our modeling approach also differ in
comparison to existing approaches with respect to the geographical distribution of
the installed wind power capacity. This is a result of the marginal local contribution
of wind power to security of supply, which is reflected in our modeling approach and
is often neglected in existing methodologies. To analyze the impact of this effect,
Figure 4.7(a) shows the geographically differentiated installed wind capacities in
2050 based on endogenous capacity value calculations. Figure 4.7(b) displays the
regional differences in installed capacities compared to an equivalent model run
with fixed wind power capacity values of 5 %. Green areas on the map in Figure
4.7(b) indicate that more wind power capacities are installed when endogenously
calculating the contribution to reliability, red areas on the other hand indicate that
less wind power capacities are installed in the respective area.
The results illustrate that there are substantial regional differences between a
model run with a constant capacity value of 5 % and our methodology. The rea-
son for the regional shifts in wind power capacity is that when the contribution to
security of supply is accounted for, it can be cost optimal to prefer locations with
relatively lower total wind power generation, which instead have a higher capacity
value. Consequently, there is a trade-off between electricity generation and con-
tribution to security of supply of one unit of wind power capacity. Because of the
weather dependency of wind power generation this trade-off depends on the wind
conditions in a specific region and the correlations with demand and wind power
generation at other sites.
It can be seen from Figure 4.7 that there is for example a shift of offshore wind
power capacity from the Netherlands to German and Belgian offshore wind regions
if the contribution to security of supply is endogenously accounted for. Additionally,
the results show that there is less onshore wind power capacity installed in central
Germany. Instead more capacity is installed for example in Spain, Romania, Finland
and Norway. Consequently, the results suggest that wind power generation is shifted
from Germany to other countries in order to spread wind power plants over a wider
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(a) Installed wind power capacity in 2050 based on
endogenous capacity value calculations
(b) Difference in optimal wind power capacity in
2050: Endogenous capacity values vs exogenous
capacity values of 5%
Figure 4.7: Allocational effects of endogenizing the capacity value of wind power in invest-
ment and dispatch models for the European electricity market
area, and take advantage of differing wind conditions on a wider geographical scope.
More generally it can be concluded that there are regional as well as technological
differences regarding offshore and onshore wind power plants between our method-
ological approach and existing modeling approaches. Hence, our results suggest that
the contribution to security of supply should be considered in studies that analyze
optimal locations of wind power generation in electricity systems based on long-term
investment models.
4.5 Conclusion
This article analyzes the contribution of wind power generation to security of sup-
ply in electricity systems and develops a new methodology to endogenously deter-
mine the capacity value of generation capacities based on variable renewable energy
sources in large-scale optimization models. Our novel framework allows to account
for the non-linear dependency of the capacity value of wind power on the amount
and spatial distribution of installed wind capacity, considering cross-border cooper-
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ation via interconnectors. Building on that, we quantify differences in system costs
and wind power capacity allocation in comparison to existing modeling approaches,
which typically assign fixed exogenous capacity values for wind power.
We find, based on a large-scale application of the proposed methodology, that
wind power substantially contributes to security of supply in a decarbonized Euro-
pean electricity system with capacity values between 1 % and 40 %. The regional
capacity value of wind power depends on the region-specific wind conditions, its
correlation to other regions, as well as on the installed wind power capacity and the
capacity of interconnections to neighboring markets. Assigning fixed and invariable
capacity values therefore results in inefficient levels of required back-up capacities
in electricity systems with high shares of variable renewable energy. We find that,
for the European electricity system, the additional yearly costs for firm capacity pro-
vision when applying exogenous fixed wind power capacity values of 5 % compared
to endogenous capacity values amount to 1.5 and 3.8 bn EUR in 2030 and 2050,
respectively, which represents additional costs of 3 % and 7 %.
Our results imply that long-term scenarios for electricity systems should account
for the contribution of variable renewable energy sources to security of supply. Addi-
tionally our results suggest that capacity mechanisms, which are being implemented
in many countries should allow for participation of generation capacities based on
variable renewable energy sources as well as cross-border contributions. However,
the assigned capacity values should be determined based on careful assessments
of the statistical properties of the variable renewable energy generation and need
to be regularly updated in order to account for changes in the system configura-
tion. Finally, our results show that market integration by increasing interconnec-
tions between different countries increases the potential of variable renewable en-
ergy sources to contribute to security of supply.
In future work our developed methodological approach could be extended to ac-
count for the electrical properties of transmission lines by integrating a load flow
model. Thereby, internal transmission constraints could be accounted for. Addition-
ally, other metrics for reliability of supply could be integrated in our model. Finally,
an application of our approach to solar power generation would be a substantial
contribution to the understanding of security of supply in electricity systems with
high shares of generation based on variable renewable energy sources.
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4.6 Appendix
4.6.1 Convergence
Figure 4.8 shows total system costs for each step of the iteration for different start
values for the capacity value. It can be seen that total system costs converge quickly
to very similar values independently of the start value. It is also apparent that
changes in total system costs are negligible after the third iteration. We abort the
iteration after the tenth step. The relative change in total system costs between the
ninth and the tenth iteration is less than 0.1 %. The results for other start values
within the depicted range were merely identical and are therefore omitted in Figure
4.8.
Figure 4.8: Convergence of total system costs in large-scale application for different starting
values
4.6.2 Spatial clustering methodology
The input data for wind and solar power generation is derived from the meteoro-
logical reanalyis dataset COSMO-REA6. The data has a high spatial resolution with
data points on a 24x24 km grid over whole Europe. In order to keep the electricity
market model computationally tractable the spatial resolution has to be reduced. We
apply a spatial clustering methodology in order to construct representative regions,
which optimally reduce the spatial resolution. Our methodology consists of three
basic steps:
1. Derive number of clusters per market and energy source
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2. Apply the clustering algorithm
3. Determine regional potential for wind and solar power capacities
(a) Wind onshore (b) Solar
Figure 4.9: Exemplary results of spatial clustering for onshore wind power (a) and solar
power (b) in Germany
In the first step we choose the number of clusters. We use a simple heuristic
approach based on the surface area of a country to determine the number of clusters
for onshore wind and solar power. The total surface are of each market is divided
by 100’000 km2 and the resulting number is rounded to determine the number of
clusters. For offshore wind we choose only one region per market for water depths
below 50 m and one region for water depths between 50 m and 150 m. The results
are presented in Table 4.6.
In the second step we apply a k-means clustering algorithm in order to cluster
the data points into the number of chosen regions. Wind power and solar power
are clustered independently in order to capture the spatial properties of both energy
sources. Based on the clustered data points the energy output of one representative
region is calculated by averaging over all data points in a cluster. Figure 4.9 shows
exemplary the clustering results for onshore wind and solar power in Germany. Each
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data point is represented by a dot, while the color coding differentiates the resulting
clusters.
In the third step the potential for installed capacity in each region is calculated for
wind and solar power. The calculation is based on the country-level area potentials
in Schmidt et al. (2016). Based on the total area potentials we calculate the regional
area potentials with the ratio between the number of data points per region and the
total data points in the corresponding country, assuming an equal distribution.
4.6.3 Numerical assumptions
Table 4.2: Assumptions on generation technology investment costs (EUR/kW)
Technology 2015 2020 2030 2040 2050
Wind onshore 1656 1602 1548 1512 1476
Wind offshore (bottom-fixed, <50 m depth) 3493 3168 2473 2236 2061
Wind offshore (floating, >50 m depth) 3749 3460 2581 2300 2099
Photovoltaics (roof) 1440 1152 972 882 792
Photovoltaics (ground) 1188 936 774 702 630
Biomass (solid) 3298 3297 3295 3293 3287
Biomass (gas) 2826 2826 2826 2826 2826
Geothermal 12752 10504 9500 9035 9026
Hydro (river) 5000 5000 5000 5000 5000
Compressed air storage 1100 1100 1100 1100 1100
Pump storage 2336 1237 1237 1237 1237
Battery 1000 1000 750 650 550
Nuclear 6253 5684 4832 4263 4263
OCGT 464 464 464 464 464
CCGT 1063 928 928 928 928
IGCC 2350 2350 2350 2300 2300
Coal 1957 1957 1957 1957 1957
Coal (advanced) 2152 2152 2152 2152 2152
Lignite 1596 1596 1596 1596 1596
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Table 4.3: Assumptions on techno-economic parameters of electricity generators
Technology FOM costs
(EUR/kW/a)
Net efficiency
(-)
Technical
lifetime (a)
Wind onshore 13 1 25
Wind offshore (bottom-fixed, <50 m depth) 93 1 25
Wind offshore (floating, >50 m depth) 93 1 25
Photovoltaics (roof) 17 1 25
Photovoltaics (ground) 15 1 25
Biomass (solid) 120 0.30 30
Biomass (gas) 165 0.40 30
Geothermal 300 0.23 30
Hydro (river) 12 1 60
Compressed air storage 9 0.70 40
Pump storage 12 0.76 60
Battery 10 0.90 20
Nuclear 101-156 0.33 60
OCGT 19 0.28-0.40 25
CCGT 24-29 0.39-0.60 30
IGCC 44-80 0.46-0.50 30
Coal 44-60 0.37-0.46 45
Coal (advanced) 64 0.49 45
Lignite 46-53 0.32-0.46 45
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Table 4.4: Assumptions on the future development of net electricity demand including net-
work losses (TWh) and the reliability target expected energy unserved EEU as
share of yearly demand (%)
Country 2015 2020 2030 2040 2050 EEU (%)
AT 70 73 77 80 80 0,005
BE 85 87 89 90 90 0,008
BG 33 41 42 44 44 0,011
CH 63 62 58 56 56 0,006
CZ 63 69 71 74 74 0,007
DE 521 565 547 552 552 0,007
DK_E 13 15 17 18 18 0,014
DK_W 20 26 30 32 32 0,014
EE 8 9 10 11 11 0,015
ES 263 268 282 283 283 0,010
FI 82 90 94 96 96 0,007
FR 475 481 467 447 447 0,013
GB 333 328 322 313 313 0,010
GR 51 57 63 70 70 0,013
HR 17 19 22 24 24 0,010
HU 41 43 47 52 52 0,002
IE 27 31 36 38 38 0,010
IT 314 326 362 400 400 0,007
LT 11 12 13 15 15 0,006
LV 7 8 8 9 9 0,008
NL 113 115 119 122 122 0,006
NO 128 136 150 143 143 0,019
PL 151 163 207 253 253 0,006
PT 49 51 53 56 56 0,009
RO 55 58 64 70 70 0,007
SE 136 142 143 142 142 0,008
SI 14 13 17 20 20 0,007
SK 27 29 33 36 36 0,004
Table 4.5: Assumptions on gross fuel prices (EUR/MWhth)
Fuel type 2015 2020 2030 2040 2050
Nuclear 3 3 3 3 3
Lignite 2 3 3 3 3
Coal 9 10 11 11 11
Oil 22 33 49 58 58
Natural gas 15 19 25 28 28
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Table 4.6: Number of spatial clusters for VRE per country
Number of clusters
Country Wind onshore Wind offshore
(<50 m depth)
Wind offshore
(>50 m depth)
Solar
AT 1 0 0 1
BE 1 1 0 1
BG 1 1 1 1
CH 1 0 0 1
CZ 1 0 0 1
DE 4 1 0 4
DK_E 1 1 1 1
DK_W 1 1 1 1
EE 1 1 1 1
ES 5 1 1 5
FI 3 1 1 3
FR 6 1 1 6
GB 2 1 1 2
GR 1 1 1 1
HR 1 1 1 1
HU 1 0 0 1
IE 1 1 1 1
IT 3 1 1 3
LT 1 1 1 1
LV 1 1 1 1
NL 1 1 0 1
NO 4 1 1 4
PL 3 1 1 3
PT 1 1 1 1
RO 2 1 1 2
SE 4 1 1 4
SI 1 0 0 1
SK 1 0 0 1
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